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The Military Courts. And Servicemen's
First Amendment Rights
By EDWARD F. SHERMAN*
THE isolation of military law from civilian influences' and the in-
dependence of the court-martial system from civilian court scrutiny
2
have tended to insulate the military from the great mtellectual ferment
that has characterized the evolution of the law surrounding the First
Amendment over the past 50 years. Many of the fertile discussions in
the academic context which have contributed to the development of a
typically American concept of free speech, such as the debates of
MeildjohnI and Chafee4 and Mendelson5 and Frantz, 6 and the writings
of Emerson,7 Kalven,8 Charles Black9 and Paul Freund, 10 have been
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law; A.B., 1959, George-
town University; M.A. 1962, M.A. 1967, Umversity of Texas at El Paso; J.D., 1962
Harvard Law School. Mr. Sherman served as civilian defense counsel in the appeals in
United States v Danels and United States v. Harvey. The author is grateful for the
research assistance of William Skees and Muriel Evens, Indiana Umversity School of
Law, 1971, and Michael Haroz, Harvard Law School, 1970.
1. See Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL LQ. 1 (1919); Morgan, The Back-
ground of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28 MILTRY L. REv. 17 (1965) (re-
printed from 6 VAND. L. REv. 169 (1953)); Sherman, The Civilianization of Military
Law, 22 MAInE L REv. 3, 3-59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sherman, Military Law].
2. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 ,Hv. L. REv.
1208-38 (1970); Note, Civilian Court Review of Court Martial Adjudications, 69
COLUM. L. REv. 1259 (1969).
3. E.g., A. MEMl.OHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, What Does
the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CmI. L. REV. 461 (1953).
4. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), reviewed, Meikle-
john, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1949).
5. E.g., W MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE
COURT (1961); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
6. E.g., Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? A Reply to Professor Mendel-
son, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963).
7. E.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.L 877 (1963).
8. E.g., Kalven, Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U.
Cm. L. REv. 315 (1960); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meanig of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Or. REv. 191; Kalven, Upon
Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 428 (1967).
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largely ignored by attorneys and judges in military speech cases. As
a result, a distinctively military philosophy of the First Amendment
still prevails in military courts which has severely limited the availability
of judicial protection for servicemen's free speech rights.
The responsibility for applying the First Amendment to the military
has fallen largely to the military courts, and especially to the Court of
Military Appeals since its creation as the "Supreme Court of the Mili-
tary" almost 20 years ago." The unavailability of civilian court re-
view except in habeas corpus actions on rather narrow grounds' 2 and the
persistence of strict doctrines of "nonreviewability" and "exhaustion of
remedies" that prevent civilian court review of most military determi-
nations' 3 have virtually excluded nonmilitary courts from any role in the
application of the First Amendment to servicemen.14 The product of
the military courts in the First Amendment area has not been distin-
guished. The courts of military review (the military's intermediate
appellate courts) have been hampered by their lack of independence
from the military establishment and uncertainty as to their judicial role.'
9. E.g., Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63.
10. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1961) [hereinafter
cited as FREUND].
11. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
12. In Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Supreme Court expanded the
prior limitation of habeas corpus review of courts-martial to questions of jurisdiction to
include claims of denial of due process which the military had manifestly refused to
consider. See generally Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1028-38 (1970).
13. See Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Ex-
haustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REV. 483, 483-505, 529-40 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Sherman, Judicial Review].
14. E.g., Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 960 (1967) (unsuccessful attempt to invoke federal court jurisdiction to enjoin
court-martial on grounds of chilling effect on First Amendment rights). When federal
courts have been willing to consider First Amendment claims of servicemen, relief has
generally been denied. Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusal to
prevent punitive activation of reservist who claimed regulations as to length of hair
violated his constitutional rights); Saunders v. Westmoreland, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP.
3157 (D.D.C. May 26, 1969) (refusal to prevent transfer overseas allegedly due to
petitioner's statements to newspaper reporter). But see Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54
(1968) (stay issued by Douglas, J., to prevent transfer overseas of serviceman claimed
to have resulted from his role in organizing peace march); United States ex rel.
Chaparro v. Resor, 412 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1969) (full hearing ordered on claim
that pretrial confinement was imposed due to petitioner's expression of antiwar senti-
ments and was therefore prohibited punishment).
15. See, e.g., statement of board of review in Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 557 (1966):
"We do not attempt here to resolve grave constitutional questions as a matter of first
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Consequently, the few First Amendment cases decided by them display
little familiarity with the precedents and scholarship in the area and
little appreciation of the issues and policies involved. The Court of
Military Appeals has decided few First Amendment cases, and with its
limited personnel of three judges, it has been so heavily preoccupied with
applying criminal due process standards to courts-martial that it has not
exhibited much sensitivity nor expertise in the First Amendment area.
As a result, the five principal First Amendment cases which have
been decided by the Court of Military Appeals, United States v. Vor-
hees'0 , United States v. Howe,17 the related cases of United States v.
Daniels's and United States v. Harvey,19 and United States v. Gray, 0
have left the First Amendment area in a confused state.
In each of these cases the court has made scant attempt to use the
experience of the Supreme Court in dealing with similar issues in other
contexts, developing instead its own rationale for a restrictive application
of the First Amendment based upon its view of the distinctive conditions
of military life.
The recent extension of greater First Amendment protections to
other groups whose right to free speech is not as broad as the ordinary
citizen's, such as students,2 ' public school teachers,22 and government
employees, 23 demonstrates the difference in approach to First Amend-
ment questions between the military and civilian courts today. The
issues, however, are not likely to remain static. Agitation for broader
free speech rights for servicemen continues, and since military authori-
ties have made only limited concessions to such demands,24 military
impression for such serious determinations of constitutionality have already been made
for us by the decisional pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and our
own Court of Military Appeals." For discussion of institutional weaknesses in the
courts of military review (called boards of review prior to Aug. 1969), see Sherman,
Military Law, supra note 1, at 47-48, 102-03.
16. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
17. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
18. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970).
19. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970).
20. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970).
21. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
22. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); American Fed. of Teachers, Local 1021 v. Los Angeles Bd. of
Education, 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
23. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Swaaley v. United
States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
24. In May 1969, the Army issued a directive on dissent which recognized the
right of servicemen, under certain circumstances, to engage in certain First Amendment
activities such as possession of literature, membership in unions, publishing of under-
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First Amendment cases are likely to continue to arise. In this develop-
ing context, it may be useful to analyze the Court of Military Appeals'
decisions concerning the First Amendment since, like so many other
constitutional decisions that were the products of compromise, they dis-
play less than a complete assurance that the course taken was correct,
and therefore they still allow for an alternative course in the future.
I. Pre-Vietnam First Amendment Cases
The American Articles of War were adopted almost verbatim from
the British Articles of War in 1775, and even after substantial changes in
1951, the Uniform Code of Military Justice still retains a number of the
18th century provisions.2 5 A number of these make a variety of speech
and speech-related activities military offenses. Obviously some such
offenses have a place in the military framework, such as communication
with the enemy, 26 disrespect toward a superior officer 27 or noncommis-
sioned officer,28 and solicitation of desertion or mutiny.29 Others re-
late to interests of more questionable validity today, such as making
"provoking words or gestures" towards another person subject to the
code,30 presumably aimed at curbing fighting among the troops, and
"contemptuous words" uttered by commissioned officers against the
President, Vice President, Congress, Secretaries, Governors, or legis-
latures, 31 allegedly aimed at keeping the military out of politics. 3 2  Fi-
nally, the two "general articles" forbid "conduct unbecoming an officer
ground papers, and attendance at off-post "coffee houses" for servicemen. Dep't of
Army, Office of the Adjutant General, AGAM-P (M) (DSCPER-SARD, Guidance on
Dissent) (May 27, 1969). In September 1969, the Department of Defense issued a
more restrictive directive on dissent. Defense Dep't Dir. 1325.6 (Sept. 12, 1969).
Slight liberalization has also taken place in response to racial troubles by permitting
Afro haircuts, longer hair, and sideburns. Directive of Marine Corps Commandant
(Sept. 3, 1969), published in N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1969, at 39, col. I (late city ed.);
Army Times, Sept. 17, 1969, at 1, col. 2; Air Force Times, Oct. 22, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
25. See Sherman, Military Law, supra note 1, at 3-59.
26. UCMJ art. 104, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
27. Id. art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889.
28. Id. art. 91, 10 U.S.C. § 891.
29. Id. art. 82, 10 U.S.C. § 882. UCMJ art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964),
concerning mutiny, makes criminal "sedition" a crime of doubtful constitution-
ality since the short-lived Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 1-4, 1 Stat. 596. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-78 (1964). Article 94 "sedition"
is virtually never used, but it is defined in specific terms resembling the requirements
for conspiracy and attempt, which may remove some of the constitutional objections.
30. UCMJ art. 117, 10 U.S.C. § 917 (1964).
31. Id. art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888.
32. See United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 174, 37 C.M.R. 429, 438
(1967).
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and a gentleman"33 (article 133), and "all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces," and
"conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces" (article
134) .3  One specification under article 134,35 the crime of making
"disloyal statements with design to promote disloyalty among the
troops," is directly aimed at speech considered to have a dangerous ef-
fect upon the troops.3  Article 134 also assimilates "crimes and
offenses not capital"'37 as defined by the federal criminal statutes, and
thus a variety of federal crimes aimed at speech, such as the 1917
Espionage Act38 and the 1940 Smith Act,-9 can be tried in courts-mar-
tial without the due process guarantees provided in civilian courts.
40
Military regulations and orders of superiors carry criminal sanctions
through the offenses of disobedience of a lawful command of a superior
officer4 or noncommissioned officer 42 and disobedience of any lawful
order or regulation. 43  These often have a direct effect upon speech.
For example, military regulations provide for censorship of speeches and
writings of members of the military,44 forbid participation in a variety
of political activities, 45 and bar participation in certain off-post demon-
33. UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964).
34. Id. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934. See generally Hagan, The General Article-
Elemental Confusion, 10 MLrARY L. RPv. 63 1960); Nichols, The Devil's Article, 27
MiLrrARY L. Rav. 111 (1963).
35. UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
36. MANUAL FOR COURTs-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES, App. 6c A6-21, f 213(f)(5)
(1969).
37. See id. at 11 213(e).
38. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, was the basis for 18 U.S.C.
§ 2388 (1964).
39. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, H8 2, 3, 5, 54 Stat. 670-71, was the basis for
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
40. The Supreme Court, in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), indicated
that the grant of court-martial jurisdiction must be narrowly construed because of the
absence of a number of constitutional rights provided in a civilian trial such as the
right to indictment by a grand jury, to trial by a jury chosen at random from one's
peers, and to a judicial process and structure free from disciplinary influences. It
has now been held that courts-martial lack jurisdiction over discharged servicemen for
crimes committed while on active duty, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11 (1957); over civilian dependents overseas in peacetime, Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
over civilian employees of the military, McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,
361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); and over offenses of
servicemen that are not service-connected, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
41. UCMJ art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1964).
42. Id. art. 91, 10 U.S.C. § 891.
43. Id. art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892.
44. Defense Dep't Dir. 5230.9 (Dec. 24, 1966).
45. Id. 1344.10 (Sept. 23, 1969).
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strations and other free speech activities.
46
Since it is only in the last decade that military courts have begun to
accept the premise that the Bill of Rights applies directly to servicemen, 7
it is perhaps not surprising that recognition of First Amendment rights is
late in coming to the military. Although civilian laws restrictive of
speech, whether phrased in terms of local police powers or national
security, have frequently been held unconstitutional, the highly restric-
tive and rather vague speech and speech-related offenses within the mili-
tary justice system have scarcely been questioned. The rationalization
that there is no place for free speech in the military because of the need
for obedience and discipline has been almost universally accepted.
Therefore, although substantial numbers of servicemen were court-mar-
tialled for speech which was critical of the President during the Civil
War,48 World War I, World War 11,50 and the Korean War,5 First
Amendment issues were rarely raised and never found to constitute a
bar to prosecution or conviction.
A. United States v. Voorhees
The first significant court-martial case to raise First Amendment
issues squarely, United States v. Vorhees (1954), 5 was not a dissenter
46. Defense Dep't Dir. 1325.6 (Sept. 12, 1969); Defense Dep't Dir. 1334.1
(Aug. 11, 1969); Army Reg. 600-20 (May 17, 1968).
47. In United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 77, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951),
the Court of Military Appeals took the position that servicemen in courts-martial were
only entitled to "military due process," that is, those rights requisite to fundamental
fairness in a court-martial derived from Congress, and enacted in UCMJ rather than
from the Bill of Rights. However, in United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29
C.M.R. 244 (1960), it reversed its position, stating, "the protection of the Bill of Rights,
except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to
members of our armed forces." Id. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47; accord, United
States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). See generally Henderson,
Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV.
293 (1957); Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice
(pts. I, II), 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 266 (1958).
48. For a description of cases, see Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President:
An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1697, 1721-23 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kester]; Vagts, Free Speech in the
Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 193 (1957).
49. See Kester 1724-29. Records of the general courts-martial, U.S. Army Ju-
diciary, show 72 convictions for seditious or disloyal statements and 7 convictions for
speaking words inducing others to misbehave from 1917 to 1919. Reply to the As-
signment of Errors at app. I, United States v. Amick & Stolte, C.M. 418868 (NBR 1968).
50. See Kester 1729-32; Reply to the Assignment of Errors at app. I, United
States v. Amick & Stolte, C.M. 418868 (NBR 1968).
51. See, e.g., McQuaid, 5 C.M.R. 525 (1952).
52. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
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case but a case involving a violation of military censorship regulations
by a career Army officer. The defendant was a lieutenant colonel
who wrote a book about the Korean War containing several passages
critical of General McArthur. 53  He submitted the book for review by
the appropriate authorities as required by military regulations;54 but
when a year later the authorities demanded that he delete certain pas-
sages, he refused and published the book without permission. He was
convicted of violating a lawful order and dismissed from the service.
Vorhees provided the newly-established Court of Military Appeals
with an opportunity to address First Amendment issues for the first time,
and although each of the three judges wrote a separate opinion, all
three recognized the applicability of the First Amendment to the mili-
tary. Chief Judge Quinn, writing the principal opinion, stated that serv-
icemen's First Amendment rights must be limited by the requirements
of military necessity, and, by interpreting the regulations to provide
for censorship in order to insure against security violations, he found
them constitutional.
Judge Brosman dissented from the majority's approval of the reg-
ulations and the finding that the regulations were limited to censorship
for security reasons. In one of the few military court opinions which
has indicated an awareness of the broad First Amendment precedents
of the Supreme Court of the 1930s and 1940s, he noted the preferred
position of free speech,55 the constitutional prohibition on prior re-
straints which strikes at censorship,56 and the constitutional infirmity
of vagueness and overbreadth.57 He maintained that military censor-
ship extending beyond security considerations to standards of "policy
and propriety," as the censorship in the Vorhees case had seemed to do,
was a violation of the First Amendment. However, he stated that he
felt the conviction might have been permissible if it were under one of
the express offenses stated in the Uniform Code.
Finally, Judge Latimer was willing to give only grudging recognition
to the First Amendment issues, stating, "I believe it ill-advised and
53. Ironically, the passages objected to by the military censors described a
breach of security regulations by General McArthur's early release of information
concerning Korean invasion plans, allegedly done to establish a more favorable image
for himself. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 516, 16 C.M.R. 83, 90 (1954).
54. Army Reg. 360-5, See. 4, para. 15C (Oct. 20, 1950).
55. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
56. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1937); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
57. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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unwise to apply the civilian concepts of freedom of speech and press to
the military services unless they are compressed within limits so narrow
they become almost unrecognizable. ' 58  He also stated that military
censorship was appropriate to insure that servicemen did not publish
writings inconsistent with military policy and propriety.59 His position
was supported by a hard-hitting argument that the military has a right
to protect both the morale of its men and its public image by censoring
critical comment:
No man willingly lays down his life for a national cause which he
is led to believe is unsound or unjust. Yet implicit in military life
is the concept that he who so serves must be prepared to do so. If
morale and discipline are destroyed, our forces cannot be trained
adequately, and the nation must necessarily fail in battle. A few
dissident writers, occupying positions of importance in the military,
could undermine the leadership of the armed forces; and if every
member of the service was, during a time of conflict, or preparation
therefor, [sic] permitted to ridicule, deride, deprecate, or destroy
the character of those chosen to lead the armed forces, and the
cause for which this country was fighting, then the war effort would
most assuredly fail. 60
Judge Latimer went further: "It matters little whether the pub-
lished comments were true or false because the effect on the public
would be the same and the cause would be weakened.""' Thus he
seemed to indorse a test which would consider the military's interest in
protecting its public image from critical comment by servicemen as
paramount, no matter what the context or circumstances, simply because
of a remote possibility that morale or the war effort might be adversely
affected. Since Vorhees in 1954, Judge Latimer's position has not been
stated in such bald terms as grounds to support court-martial convic-
tions, but it is still frequently relied upon as grounds for excluding criti-
58. 4 U.S.C.M.A. at 531, 16 C.M.R. at 105.
59. After the Vorhees decision, the Armed Services expressly limited censorship
to security purposes with respect to the press, but its scope was broader with respect
to speech by military personnel. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 187, 203 (1957). However, since Vorhees did not determine whether censor-
ship must be limited to security purposes, it has been assumed that it need not be.
In 1966, a Department of Defense directive was issued requiring prior review of all
speeches or writings of department employees on matters of national interest, subjects
of potential controversy between the services, and policy matters within the purview of
other federal agencies. A speech or writing could only be released "after it has been
reviewed for security and for conflict with established Department of Defense and
Government policies and programs." Defense Dep't Dir. 5230.9 (Dec. 24, 1966) noted
in Brown, Must the Soldier be a Silent Member o1 Our Society?, 43 MILITARY L. REV.
71, 94-97 (1969).
60. 4 U.S.C.M.A. at 533, 16 C.M.R. at 107.
61. Id., 16 C.M.R. at 107.
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cal literature or speech activities from military installations.62
B. Other Post-Korean War Cases
The Court of Military Appeals heard only two cases involving
First Amendment issues between the 1954 Vorhees decision and the
Vietnam War, and it disposed of them without reaching the constitu-
tional issues. In United States v. Wysong,63 a sergeant, who had at-
tempted to persuade other servicemen not to give information in an
official investigation of his wife, was ordered by his superior officer not
to talk to anyone about the investigation except in line of duty. The
court found the order invalid, despite its valid purpose, since it was too
broad, applying even off-duty, and was too vague and indefinite. Al-
though the court did not expressly rest its decision on First Amend-
ment grounds, it indicated that the order would have sealed the sergeant
off from the other men, an obvious violation of First Amendment rights.
The other case, United States v. Schmidt,64 involved a soldier who
felt he was being harassed by his first sergeant for complaining to his
Senator about food and living conditions. He told his commander that
he was going to send a press release headlined "FT. RILEY SOLDIER
RECEIVES PUNISHMENT FOR EXERCISING RIGHTS" to the
newspapers if the harassment did not stop. He was court-martialled
62. Military regulations require prior permission from commanders to distribute
literature on post and permit a commander to bar distribution if he determines "a clear
danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of members of the Armed Forces, or ma-
terial interference with the accomplishment of a military mission would result." Air
Force Reg. 35-15, f 2.a.(2) (June 12, 1970). See also Army Reg. 210-1, para. 5-5 (Sept.
30, 1968). An anti-war serviceman, Pvt. Joseph D. Miles, obtained permission in
1969 to distribute a reprint of the Bill of Rights and the enlisted man's oath for 2
hours from three intersections at Ft. Bragg. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1969, at 11, col. 1
(late city ed.). But with rare exception, GI underground newspapers have been
banned from posts. Scott, "Dissenters in Uniform," Family (Air Force Times insert),
Aug. 19, 1970, at 4. See also Yahr v. Resor, 431 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1970) (denial
of preliminary injunction against base commander who refused to permit distribution
of "underground" paper published by off-duty servicemen affirmed and remanded to
determine if proper basis for refusal); Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp.
849 (D.S.C. 1969) (action for declaratory judgment that enlisted men have a con-
stitutional right to distribute anti-war literature, hold on-post meetings to discuss
war and grievances, and participate in other speech activities). Civilians have
been barred from post for speech activities, Weissman v. United States, 387 F.2d
271 (10th Cir. 1967); Bridges v. Davis, 311 F. Supp. 935 (D. Hawaii 1969). But
see Kilshila v. Nichols, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3165 (7th Cir., Aug. 3, 1970); Com-
mittee to Free the Ft. Dix 38 v. Commanding Officer, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3163
(3d Cir., July 13, 1970); United States v. Bradley, 418 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1969);
Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
63. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 26 C.M.R. 29 (1958).
64. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 36 C.M.R. 213 (1966).
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and convicted of extortion and wrongful communication of a threat.
The court reversed in three separate opinions, the principal opinion by
Judge Kilday holding that affirmance "would not comport with the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."65
Judge Ferguson emphasized the free speech aspects, stating that disci-
pline had been "perverted into an excuse for retaliating against a sol-
dier for doing only that which Congress had expressly said it wishes
him to be free to do," and that "[i]t was also open to him respectfully
to make known his intention to air his just grievance publicly, without
being subjected to adjudication as a blackmailer." 6
II. Vietnam War First Amendment Cases
A. United States v. Howe
It was inevitable that the Vietnam war, which has caused deep di-
visions among other Americans, would also generate dissent among
servicemen. Thus, shortly after President Johnson ordered combat
troops into Vietnam, a significant First Amendment case arose involv-
ing the attempt by a young officer to express his feelings about the ad-
ministration's war policies.67 Second Lieutenant Henry Howe, Jr., sta-
tioned at Ft. Bliss, Texas, read in the newspapers that a group of pro-
fessors and students at the local university were going to hold a demon-
stration against American policy in Vietnam in the main plaza of El
Paso on a Saturday morning.6 8 He made a sign reading "LET'S
HAVE MORE THAN A CHOICE BETWEEN PETTY IGNORANT
FACISTS [sic] IN 1968" and on the other side, "END JOHNSON'S
FACIST [sic] AGGRESSION IN VIET NAM," and while off-duty and
dressed in civilian clothes he drove to the plaza, some 8 miles from Ft.
Bliss, and joined a line of about twelve demonstrators who were walking
in a circle carrying signs reading "LET'S GET OUR BOYS OUT OF
VIET NAM," "GET OUT OF VIET NAM," "PEACE IN VIET
NAM," and "WOULD JESUS CARRY A DRAFT CARD?" '69 A
crowd of about two thousand had assembled around the demonstrators,
a large number of them supporting the Vietnam war including some
with "WIN IN VIET NAM" signs and some American Legionnaires in
uniform passing out American flags.70 There were a few cat-calls and
65. Id. at 61, 36 C.M.R. at 217.
66. Id., 36 C.M.R. at 217.
67. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
68. Id. at 168, 37 C.M.R. at 432.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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comments aimed at the demonstrators, but since there was a substan-
tial police contingent on hand, there was never any threat of a violent
confrontation.
71
The crowd was predominantly civilian.72 One military policeman
testified later that he recognized only three or four other soldiers in the
crowd, although others may have been present in civilian clothes.73
Lt. Howe, however, was recognized by one of the military policemen.
He was tried and convicted by a general court-martial of two military
crimes applicable only to officers: making contemptuous words against
the President under article 88, and conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman under article 133. 71 He was sentenced to dismissal, for-
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for 2
years (later reduced to 1 year).
7 5
1. THE DEcIsIoN OF THE BOARD OF REvIEw
The Army Board of Review affirmed the conviction in an opinion
that demonstrated the gulf between the treatment of First Amendment
cases in military and civilian courts.76 No attempt was made to consider
the case in light of civilian precedents; in fact, the only Supreme Court
First Amendment case cited was the 1927 decision in Whitney v. Cali-
fornia,77 a decision which has since been expressly overruled by the
Supreme Court. 78  The board did state that military tribunals are
bound to protect the First Amendment rights that apply to servicemen
but, in a now-familiar rubric, added that First Amendment rights are
not absolutes and must be subjected to reasonable limitations based on
military necessity. The board had no difficulty in identiying those "rea-
sonable limitations." In language reminiscent of the presumption of
constitutionality given to legislative enactments in the economic reg-
ulation cases of the late 1930s and 1940s, the board observed that
Congress has the power under article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Con-
stitution "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces" and therefore:
It is not for us to question the wisdom of Congress in enacting Arti-
cles 88 and 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as ap-
71. See id.
72. Id., 37 C.M.R. at 433.
73. Id. at 169, 37 C.M.R. at 433.
74. Id. at 167, 37 C.M.R. at 431.
75. Id.
76. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555 (1966).
77. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
78. Brandenburg v. Obio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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pellant would have us do. . . . Further, we need not decide the
precise balance to be struck between appellant's claim of a pre-
ferred right to free speech and the Congressional limitations im-
posed upon the exercise of that right. The overriding power in the
Congress on the subject of military justice had been consistently rec-
ognized by the decisions of the Supreme Court and the United
States Court of Military Appeals. Burns v. Wilson, 346 US 137,
140, 97 L. Ed. 1508, 73 S Ct 1045 (1953); Dynes v. Hoover, 20
Howard 65, 79 (US 1858); United States v. Culp, [14 U.S.C.M.A.
199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963)] at 416 .... Accordingly, ap-
pellant's right, as an officer, to speak may not override a reasonable
and necessary standard of conduct firmly entrenched in our system
of military justice. Our only concern . . is whether the conduct
of the appellant, of which he stands convicted, falls within the pale
of what Congress in its wisdom proscribed. 79
The precedents cited by the board all refer to passages supporting
the proposition that due to Congress' constitutional power over the
Armed Forces and the special status of the military under the Execu-
tive branch, courts are hesitant to interfere with the military. This doc-
trine, insofar as it was applied to create a sort of presumption as to the
validity of court-martial convictions against claims of constitutional
deprivations, is now thoroughly discredited. 0 It still has some vitality
in cases where the issue is whether civilian court review of discretionary
military determinations is appropriate or whether exhaustion of mili-
tary remedies has been accomplished or should be required prior to such
review;"' but the day is long past when servicemen's constitutional rights
can be overridden by mere invocation of Congress' consttitutional power
over the Armed Forces or reference to standards "firmly entrenched in
our system of military justice."
The board's decision also ignores the special status given First
Amendment rights under prior Supreme Court precedents. Although
the "preferred status of First Amendment rights" theory is not univer-
sally accepted, 2 the Supreme Court continues to indicate that the
legislative presumption working in favor of the constitutionality of
economic legislation is not applicable in free speech cases.8" The
79. 37 C.M.R. at 558-59.
80. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 43 HRv. L. REV.
1208-1233; Sherman, Judicial Review, supra note 13, at 486-89.
81. See Sherman, Judicial Review, supra note 13, at 496-505, 520-26.
82. Compare Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), with Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90-96 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Frantz, The First
Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440-48 (1962); McKay, The Preference
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1191-93 (1959).
83. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967);
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board's test-whether Lt. Howe's conduct "falls within the pale of what
Congress in its wisdom proscribed" 84-places far too much emphasis
upon the presumed validity of congressional exercise of power to gibe
with contemporary First Amendment requirements.
a) Effect on Subordinate-Superior Relationships
Despite the board's invocation of a presumption of legislative va-
lidity and a disclaimer of any intention to balance interests, it did go
on to discuss the government interests involved in the conviction of Lt.
Howe. It viewed the article 8 8 prohibition on an officer's contemptuous
words against the President as necessary for the preservation of order
and dicsipline in the military which, in turn, was viewed as essential to
the ultimate purpose of the military "to prepare for and to be successful
in combat against the enemies of the United States. '85  In what one
commentator has termed "a sort of disciplinary domino theory,"86 the
board argued that the whole hierarchy of military command was threat-
ened by Lt. Howe's contemptuous words against the President:
The appellant may not contemptuously assail his Commander-
in-Chief with impunity no more than he may behave himself with
disrespect toward his superior officer. His relationship as an offi-
cer to the President, the highest source of military command au-
thority, in this regard is significantly the same as his relationship to
his superior officer-in both instances, respect is required and
demanded. . . . The preservation of the necessary subordinate-
superior relationship in the military service permits no such privi-
lege or impunity, especially where, as here, a military officer no-
toriously vilifies the very superior authority to whom a duty of re-
spect is owing and who appointed him to military office.87
The difficulty with this rationale is that it is extremely difficult to
find a causal connection between contemptuous words about a political
figure and injury to superior-subordinate relationships. It is possible
that use of contemptuous words by a subordinate concerning a superior
whom he knows personally or with whom he comes into contact would
have an undesirable effect upon their relationship and, therefore, upon
the mission of the organization. Such an effect is much more doubt-
ful, however, when the superior is simply the nominal Commander-in-
Chief of a multi-million man army. Obedience is necessary in the
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 269-79 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31
(1963).
84. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 560 (1966).
85. Id. at 559.
86. Kester, supra note 48, at 1753.
87. 37 C.M.R. at 559.
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military, but as Kester has observed,
Whether the required obedience will be affected at all by state-
ments of dislike towards a remote political figure with whom the
speaker's relationship is little more than an abstraction is at least
problematical. The military code quite amply provides for punish-
ment of any disrespect towards a military superior. 88
The application of article 88 only to officers and the consequent
implication that enlisted men are free to use contemptuous words
against government officials-at least within the bounds of other legiti-
mate limitations on their conduct 8 -makes the justification for a crimi-
nal offense based on officers' contemptuous words even more question-
able. There is, however, a considerable tradition in the military which
views the status of the commissioned officer as requiring a high degree
of conformity to rigid standards of personal conduct. Commissions
are viewed as coming directly from the President, thus entitling one to
the special privileges and prerogatives of the officer class but also re-
quiring a higher standard of conduct and a special loyalty, almost like
medieval fealty, to the Commander-in-Chief. This tradition may help
to explain the board's anger at a young officer who "notoriously and ig-
nominiously vilifies the very superior authority to whom a duty of re-
spect is owing and who appointed him to military office" and its ready
acceptance of the notion that such conduct was a threat to the very
existence of the military.
It is unrealistic, however, particularly under present-day condi-
tions, to find a serious threat to the military from the mere use of con-
temptuous words against the President by an officer. In an army where
most second lieutenants are serving only a mandatory 2-year tour and
military formalism is increasingly giving way to the pragmatic consid-
erations of bureaucratization and specialization,"0 the traditional atti-
tudes of officers concerning duty and respect towards remote superiors
have been substantially diluted. Furthermore, the President today,
although Commander-in-Chief, is much more importantly a political
figure, and at certain times a very controversial one. The recent Su-
preme Court decision91 reversing a conviction for threatening the life
88. Kester, supra note 48, at 1753-54.
89. The predecessor of article 88 prior to the UCMJ applied to all servicemen.
Today, enlisted men's speech that is contemptuous of government officials may still
fall under the provisions of article 134 as "disloyal statements" or "disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline" or "conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces."
90. See M. JANOWITZ, THE MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NATIONS
119-120 (1964); M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 8 (1960).
91. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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of the President of a defendant who said at a rally, "If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J."92 pro-
vides a good example of the contemporary view of the President's status.
The Court held the statement was "political hyperbole" protected by the
First Amendment, implying that the role of the President as a political
figure is not immune from even extremely intemperate criticism.93
b) EHect on Order and Discipline
The board also reasoned that Lt. Hove's conduct would have a
direct and detrimental effect upon order, discipline, and his perform-
ance as an officer because soldiers '"could hardly be expected to willfully
and cheerfully respond to the orders of the appellant where the latter
has publicly manifested such disloyalty and contempt to his superior."94
If indeed the enlisted men in Lt. Howe's unit would not be able to follow
his orders and direction because of his participation in the peace march,
then his conduct would have a direct effect upon his ability to perform
his duties and the military might have a legitimate interest in taking ac-
tion in respect to that conduct. However, in Lt. Howe's case no evi-
dence was presented in the court-martial indicating such an effect upon
his performance as an officer. Since only three or four military men
could be identified as present, and Lt. Howe, dressed in civilian clothes,
was not readily identifiable as an Army officer, 95 it seems unlikely
that his participation in the march would have ever reached the notice
of his men back at Ft. Bliss had the military not arrested him and cata-
pulted his activities onto the front pages of the newspapers.
Even if Lt. Howe's conduct had resulted in publicity which iden-
tified him as an officer, still the threat to his ability to carry out his duties
is questionable. Quite apart from the fact that in today's Army an offi-
cer who displays concern over such socially relevant issues such as the
Vietnam War may win the admiration of some enlisted men, it is doubtful
whether an officer's ability to carry out his duties, especially in an ad-
ministrative position such as Lt. Howe's (he was assistant motor officer
in an engineer battalion), would be in any way affected. In fact, the
military trains its men to be obedient to the office, and not to the man.
It would be a serious sign of failure of the military system if soldiers re-
fused to respond to officers because of their off-duty expressions of
political beliefs.
92. Id. at 706.
93. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
94. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 557 (1966).
95. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 169, 37 C.M.R. 429, 433 (1967).
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c) Effect on Fitness as an Officer
The board's contention that the use of contemptuous words about
the President necessarily affects an officer's ability to command obedi-
ence and respect from his subordinates has a related and somewhat
more convincing aspect. Use of such words may, in itself, show that
an individual is unfit to carry out the duties of an officer even if it has
no immediate effect upon his performance. Obviously a variety of non-
criminal conduct, especially pertaining to moral and social standards,
may provide grounds for a determination that one is not fit to be an of-
ficer, and the military, like any employer, should not be required to con-
tinue such an individual in his position after such a determination.
This rationale, however, is not suitable for justifying the result in
Howe. First, it is not at all certain that Lt. Howe's participation in the
demonstration should be considered the type of conduct which demon-
strates unfitness as an officer in today's Army. Possibly his unwise
choice of words on the placard could place his conduct within this cate-
gory, but given the expected anonymity of his act and the usual indul-
gence given to "political hyperbole,"9 6 such conduct alone would seem
insufficient to prove unfitness. Second, the action taken against Lt.
Howe was not administrative, such as a reprimand, an unfavorable rat-
ing, removal from his job, or dismissal from the Army; it was a criminal
prosecution for a felony.9" Although the Army might have had legiti-
mate grounds to discipline or even to dismiss him,9 8 a criminal prosecu-
tion raises very different considerations. Criminal prosecution is a
much more serious form of official response to an employee's speech
and raises criminal due process as well as First Amendment considera-
tions. Surely the degree of proof and immediacy of danger to a legiti-
mate government interest should be considerably stronger for a court-
martial than that required for dismissal on the same grounds. The
board seems to have accepted all too uncritically the military rhetoric
about an officer being held to a "higher standard of conduct"99 without
96. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1968).
97. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 167, 37 C.M.R. 429, 431 (1967).
98. Grounds for discharge and dismissal are established by statute and by regu-
lations issued pursuant to them. Although the military has broad discretionary powers
to discharge particular individuals from the service, discharge may be voided if in
violation of: statutory authority, Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per cur-
iam); regulations, Roberts v. Vance, 343 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1964); or statutory
standards, Kennedy v. Secretary of the Navy, 401 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Ashe v.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961)
(dictum). See also Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
99. See, e.g., Weiner, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally
Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357, 358-63 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Weiner].
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distinguishing the military's use of administrative means to reprimand
or to remove an officer from its more questionable right to treat him as
a criminal.
The issue is not unique to the military; similar problems arise when
a public employee criticizes official policies or his superiors. It was
once generally accepted that public employees owed a duty of loyalty
to all officials up the chain of command and therefore that they could
be fired for critical speech. 100 This position, however, has been re-
jected by the courts. In Swalley v. United States,'' the Court of Claims
held that a Brooklyn Navy Yard employee who wrote a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy alleging favoritism in promotions could not be
dismissed from his job even though he failed to demonstrate that there
was a reasonable basis for the statements. The court held that the
New York Times'012 rule of actual malice applies to such statements by
public employees because suppression of criticism would have a stifling
effect upon their free speech rights.'0 3 Then, in 1968, the United States
Supreme Court resolved the issue in Pickering v. Board of Education,1
0 4
holding that a public school teacher could not be dismissed for writing a
letter to a local newspaper that was critical of the board of education
even if it contained false statements if they were not made knowingly or
recklessly. The board had contended, as did the Army in Howe, that
the teacher owed a duty of loyalty to support his superiors. 0 5 The
Court found that since the letter was not directed towards any person
with whom the teacher would normally be in contact in the course of his
daily work, the criticism of his "ultimate employer" neither impeded his
performance in the classroom nor interfered with the regular operation
of the schools generally.'0 6 In a footnote the Court recognized that
other considerations might be pertinent in those cases where "the need
for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public state-
100. Justice Holmes' statement in McAuliffe v. Bedford, 155 Mass. 253, 29 N.E.
517 (1892), was often quoted that "a person may have a constitutional right to talk
politics but no constitutional right to be a policeman." This aphorism is criticized in
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
101. 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
102. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
103. Swalley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Judge Fahy's dis-
sent, in Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901
(1964), involving dismissal of an FBI agent for writing letters alleging irregularities
in the Oklahoma City FBI office to a Senator and Congressman, took the position
that the New York Times rule should apply to such criticism.
104. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
105. Id. at 568.
106. Id. at 569-70.
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ments might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal" or "the rela-
tionship between a superior and subordinate is of such a personal and
intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the superior by
the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the
working relationship between them.' 10
7
Since Pickering, federal courts have given broad protection to pub-
lic employees' right to engage in critical speech.' °8 Nonetheless they
have permitted dismissal in situations where the superior-subordinate re-
lationship is so intimate that the criticism threatens discipline and har-
mony on the job,0 9 where the speech indicates unfitness to perform
duties, 1 or where it is blatantly false or recklessly inaccurate."' Of
particular interest are the cases involving critical speech by members of
the para-military. Brukiewa v. Police Commissioner of Baltimore..
involved the dismissal of a police officer, an official in the policemen's
union, for criticizing police department procedures and the police com-
missioner on local television. The trial judge upheld the dismissal
proceedings, finding that his statements were "corrosive of confidence
in the police department" and that "the morale and discipline of the
Department had to obviously suffer from the divisive effects of the state-
ments. ' 113  The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that
despite the need for obedience and discipline in the police force, his
statements were not directed toward a superior with whom he came in
frequent contact. They did not impair his fitness to perform his daily
duties and, therefore, were protected by the First Amendment." 4
Meehan v. Macy" 5 involved the dismissal of a Canal Zone po-
lice officer, also a union official, for making extremely critical state-
ments about policies during a tense and unstable period in the Canal
Zone. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed his
dismissal for conduct unbecoming a police officer,'1 but after Picker-
107. Id. at 570 n.3.
108. Burkett v. United States, 402 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (civilian employee of
Department of Defense); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969) (Peace
Corps volunteer); Donovan v. Mobley, 291 F. Supp. 930 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (police
department life guard); Puentes v. Board of Education, 24 N.Y.2d 996, 250 N.E.2d
232, 302 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1969) (teacher); Tepedino v. Dumpson, 24 N.Y.2d 705, 249
N.E.2d 751, 301 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1969) (social worker).
109. Watts v. Seward, 454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969).
110. Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
111. Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285 (Ct. CI. 1969).
112. 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970).
113. Id. at 43, 263 A.2d at 218.
114. Id. at 57, 263 A.2d at 221.
115. 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
116. Id.
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ing was announced, it granted a rehearing en banc and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Pickering.
117
Since the board of review and Court of Military Appeals decisions
in Howe preceeded Pickering, the type of inquiries deemed relevant in
Pickering and its progeny were not made. Under those standards, there
seems to be nothing in the record to warrant suppression of Lt. Howe's
First Amendment rights. The military courts which have considered
critical speech by servicemen since Pickering, however, have ignored the
decision,11 and at least at present, the First Amendment protections ex-
tended to teachers, policemen, and other public employees have not
been applied to servicemen.
2. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction of Lt.
Howe on a somewhat different rationale than that applied by the board
of review. It expressly endorsed the "clear and present danger test"
as the appropriate standard for determining whether Lt. Howe's speech
could be curbed, and after citing a selective group of narrow cases
which had applied the test,1 9 it then concluded, with almost no analy-
sis, that the conditions of the test were met:
We need not determine whether a state of war presently exists. We
do judicially know that hundreds of thousands of members of our
military forces are committed to combat in Vietnam, casualties
among our forces are heavy, and thousands are being recruited, or
drafted, into our armed forces. That in the present times and cir-
cumstances such conduct by an officer constitutes a clear and pres-
ent danger to discipline within our armed services, under the prece-
dents established by the Supreme Court, seems to require no argu-
ment. 1
20
Without clearly identifying its approach, the court seems to have
used the phrase "clear and present danger" to describe the sort of ad hoc
balancing test espoused by the Supreme Court in Dennis.'2' Unlike
the board of review, however, it did not view the military interest in-
volved as protection against an immediate threat to order and discipline.
Although it stated that "the evil which Article 88. . .seeks to avoid is
117. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
118. Harvey, 40 C.M.R. 941 (1969); Bell, 40 C.M.R. 807 (1969); Amick & Stolte,
40 C.M.R. 720 (1969); Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968).
119. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
120. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 173-74, 37 C.M.R. 429, 437-38
(1967).
121. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 494-95 (1950): "In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
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the impairment of dicipline and the promotion of insubordination by
an officer of the military service,' 1 22 the court made little attempt to
demonstrate that Lt. Howe's conduct actually posed such a threat.
a) The "Man on a White Horse" Rationale
Instead, the court devised a new rationale: suppression of Lt.
Howe's speech was justified because "the ancient and wise provisions
[of the military law] insuring civilian control of the military will restrict
the 'man on a white horse.' "123 This approach to the First Amendment
apparently involves an entirely different governmental interest than the
protection of good order and discipline which concerned the board of
review. Due to the importance of the interest involved-the protection
of the government-it could arguably pose just as great a "clear and
present danger" under the Dennis ad hoc balancing approach. If
this is the proper context, the strained attempts of the board to prove
that Lt. Howe's conduct was an immediate threat to order and discipline
would become quite unnecessary. The governmental interest in pro-
tecting the Republic from military coups by men on white horses, much
like the governmental interest in national security deemed paramount
in Dennis, would clearly outweigh Lt. Howe's First Amendment rights.
The court cited no precedent for its "man on a white horse" ration-
ale; it quoted instead at considerable length from Chief Justice War-
ren's 1962 James Madison Lecture at New York University School
of Law in which he observed that in this hemisphere only the United
States and Canada have avoided rule by the military throughout our
national existence, a result attributed to civilian supremacy in govern-
ment.2 4 This new rationale, however, especially if it can be interpreted
to justify prosecuting a second lieutenant for criticizing the President
publicly, needs to be examined much more carefully.
(1) Historical Validity
The historical premise for concluding that strict separation of mem-
bers of the military from politics has saved this country from takeover
by a "man on a white horse" is itself questionable. The degree of in-
volvement in politics by military men in this country has always been
substantial. It could hardly be said that a country with seven General-
122. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 173-74, 37 C.M.R. 429, 437-83
(1967).
123. Id. at 175, 37 C.M.R. at 439.
124. Id. at 174-75, 37 C.M.R. at 438-39, quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and
the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181, 183 (1962).
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Presidents, a country that has elected war heroes to the Presidency after
almost every war, accurately illustrates the virtue of strict separation of
military men from political affairs. In this century, General Leonard
Wood actively campaigned for a military buildup prior to our entry into
World War I in violation of administration policy;'25 General Patton
made statements during World War II at odds with administration
policies concerning allies and post-war plans;' 26 and General Mac-
Arthur criticized the administration's Korean War policies in letters to
opposition members of Congress. 2 7  Activities on behalf of Generals
Eisenhower and MacArthur to secure the 1952 Republican Presiden-
tial nomination were undertaken while both were still on active duty,
and, in fact, so many Generals made speeches related to political issues
in that campaign that sociologist C. Wright Mills concluded, "There is
no doubt about it: There are now Republican and Democratic gen-
erals."'
28
Nevertheless, military men have been disciplined because of their
involvement in politics. General Billy Mitchell was court-martialled for
his aggressive campaign against the official military rejection of ex-
panded air power after World War 1,129 and General MacArthur was
removed from his post as Allied Commander in Korea after his con-
tinued criticisms of administration policies. 30 In 1961 General Edwin
Walker was relieved of his command in Europe after publicity about
his political activities. These reportedly included distribution of John
Birch Society literature to day rooms and Army newsstands, indoctri-
nation of troops with allegedly "right wing!' materials, and public accu-
sations that a number of former public officials, including presidents
Roosevelt and Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, were "defi-
nitely pink."' 31
Running at crosscurrents to all of this is the strong opposition that
has been expressed by high-ranking military men to the limitations on
their right to discuss political matters. General Walker said in 1961:
125. Kester, supra note 48, at 1733 n.225.
126. 0. BRADLEY, A SoLDIER's STORY 230-31, 393 (1951).
127. R. RoVERE & A. SCHLESINGER, THE GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT 169-70
(1951).
128. C. MILLs, THE POWER ELIrr 204 (1959).
129. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. Rv. 187, 196
(1957).
130. L. KOENIG, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,
348-55 (ed. 1956).
131. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1961, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.); id., Apr. 17, 1961, at
15, col. 1 (late city ed.); id., June 13, 1961, at 1, col. 7 (late city ed.); id., Sept. 7, 1961,
at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.).
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If men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on a
matter which may involve the most serious and alarming conse-
quences that can invite the consideration of mankind, reason is of
no use to us; freedom of speech may be taken away, and dumb and
silent we may be led, like sheep, to the slaughter.132
General Curtis LeMay, a vice-presidential candidate on the Wallace
third-party ticket in 1968, strongly objected to the "muzzling" of the
military and argued that the "man on a white horse" threat was greatly
exaggerated. 1
33
General MacArthur made one of the most fundamental attacks
on the policy of military political neutrality in an address to the Massa-
chusetts Legislature on July 25, 1951, shortly after his removal from
command by President Truman. He said:
I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous
concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary alle-
giance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of
the executive branch of government, rather than to the country and
its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.
No proposition could be more dangerous. None could cast
greater doubt upon the integrity of the armed forces.
For its application would at once convert them from their tra-
ditional constitutional role as the instrument for defense of the Re-
public into something partaking of the nature of a pretorian guard,
owing sole allegiance to the political master of the hour.134
It is obviously true that high-ranking military men may be es-
pecially well informed about at least some national issues, and there-
fore, that they are able to make important contributions to the public de-
bate on them. Nonetheless, there must be the inevitable recognition
that generals and other high-ranking officers are in a position to exert
a tremendous influence upon public opinion. And it is this danger or
power that is to be avoided by the "man on a white horse" rationale.
(2) Dissent in Uniform
A question parallel to critical speech arises regarding the wearing
of the uniform in conjunction with activities critical of the government.
Participation in off-post demonstrations while in uniform violates mili-
tary regulations' 3" and may also be grounds for court-martial as "con-
duct unbecoming an officer" or "conduct of a nature to bring discredit
132. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1961, at 22, col. 1. (late city ed.).
133. C. LEMAY, AMERICA IN DANGER 7, 9 (1968).
134. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1951, at 12, col. 1 (late city ed.).
135. Army Reg. 600-20, para. 46 (May 17, 1968). See also Defense Dep't Dir.
1334.1, "Wearing of the Uniform" (Aug. 11, 1969).
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upon the armed forces."'13 6  Here too, however, it is questionable
whether the military ban on wearing of the uniform is really aimed at
maintaining political neutrality and at preventing the dangers raised
by the "man on a white horse" rationale.
It is true that servicemen in uniform are likely to be noticed and
that their participation in activities that are critical of government poli-
cies may raise doubts as to their loyalty to the government and ability of
the government to command the support and obedience of its troops.
There is, however, little in the American political tradition to suggest
such dangers from the mere wearing of uniforms in conjunction with
critical speech activities. The public has grown accustomed in recent
years to the sight of striking or protesting teachers, policemen, and
other public employees, and there seems to be increasing recognition
that public employees are capable of performing their duties con-
scientiously while still opposing policies of their employer. Further-
more, the American political tradition, especially as expressed by the
First Amendment, accepts the premise that citizens may oppose the
government without forfeiting their loyalty to their country. There
seems to be little basis for concluding that soldiers cannot do likewise.
Although the threat of undue military pressure or a coup is unlikely
when servicemen or even small numbers of servicemen are considered
individually, that may change if servicemen from the same unit appear
together as a military group due to the suggestion of coordinated soli-
darity and organization. The threat involved, however, is dependent
upon such factors as the number of servicemen involved, the nature
of the activity, and the degree of active participation by servicemen.
Certainly military regulations aimed at preventing group participation
in off-post demonstrations where unlawful or violent activities are
likely to result would stand on a different footing than a blanket pro-
hibition of uniformed participation. Unfortunately, however, the Court
of Military Appeals in Howe dealt with none of the subtle and difficult
issues raised in these situations, and the "man on a white horse" rationale
136. The constitutionality of such regulations has not been determined by any mili-
tary appellate court, although courts-martial have been based on them. Lt. Susan
Schnall was court-martialled for participation in uniform in an October 1968, peace
march in San Francisco. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1969, at 5, col. 3 (late city ed.). Court-
martial charges against Lt. Dennis Morrisseau, who stood in front of the White House
in March 1968, in uniform with a sign reading "120,000 AMERICAN CASUAL-
TIES-WHY?," were dropped because of evidence of command influence. Sherman,
Buttons, Bumper Stickers and the Soldier, THE NaW REPuBLIC Aug. 17, 1968, at
15 [hereinafter cited as Sherman, Buttons]; L. West, The Command Domination of the
Military Judicial Process, Aug. 10, 1969 (unpublished thesis in George Washington
University Law School, Washington, D.C.) at 298-329.
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provides little guidance as to the relevant factors for consideration.
(3) The Government's Use of the Serviceman in Politics
One very troubling aspect of the "man on a white horse" rationale
is that both the government and the military have effectively used mili-
tary personnel to affirmatively support government policies and to
propagandize for those policies in the media. The military maintains an
extensive public relations program designed exclusively to affect civilian
opinions concerning government and military policies '1 7 and, in the
late 1950s, a mandatory program of troop indoctrination was imple-
mented for similar purposes.
138
The Department of Defense, the services, and most military posts
and installations have speakers' bureaus that provide military speakers,
usually in uniform, to present the "official" point of view on a variety
of public issues. This service is not unpopular as noted by Derek
Shearer of the Institute for Policy Studies:
Through speakers' bureaus which each Army post is encouraged
to maintain, an estimated 1,000 audiences a month are provided
with Army speakers. Young, returned veterans from Vietnam
are urged to address public gatherings; Army Digest noted proudly
that, since returning from Vietnam, a Col. John G. Hughes had de-
livered 240 speeches. The Washington Post reported in Decem-
ber 1969 that an Army major was used by the Pentagon to pro-
vide public counterattacks to critics of the war. Maj. James Rowe,
who spent five years as a captive of the Vietcong, filmed twenty
television interviews and cut six radio tapes with Congressmen;
the tapes were sent to the home stations of the Congressmen or used
in Army information programs. In several of these appearances.
Rowe questioned the patriotism of Sen. George McGovern, and
charged that the American liberal press was printing material
which breaks the morale of American prisoners ...
Under the rubric of Community relations, the services operate
traveling exhibits which tour the country, telling the military"story." The Army's community Relations Branch estimates that
137. There has been substantial military interest in public relations since World
War II. In 1948, General MacArthur had 135 military and 40 civilian aides as-
signed to his Far East Command for publicity functions and General Eisenhower
had 44 military and 113 civilian aides for the same purpose. J. SWOMLEY, JR., THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 113-28 (1964). $27,953,000 was allocated for military
public relations in 1969. Shearer, The Brass Image, THE NATION, vol. 210, Apr. 20,
1970, at 455 [hereinafter cited as Shearer].
138. The National Security Council authorized the military to engage in political
education of troops following public criticism of the response of American prisoners of
war to indoctrination in the Korean War. See Hearings of the Special Preparedness
Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 72-73
(1961).
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some 13.5 million people viewed twenty-two of its travelling ex-
hibits in the last half of 1968.139
Although congressional critics have questioned the size and parti-
sanship of certain military information and public relations programs,
140
few would question the right of the military to engage in such activities
altogether. Military propaganda aimed at civilians, even if deceptive,
has generally been taken for granted in wartime.' 41 Thus in World
War II, propaganda about the invincibility of our Armed Forces, the
virtues of our commanders, and the superiority of our weapons was
considered essential to preserve civilian support and morale. This
justification .is more difficult to maintain in time of peace or limited war
when propaganda is not as necessary to spur civilian war production or
to bolster the morale of a civilian populace undergoing shortages and
hardships. It would appear that military propaganda today, which is
more of the information and public relations variety, is particularly re-
lated to encouraging volunteers for the Armed Forces and to providing
public support for military policies and budgetary needs.
But if the military is justified in using active duty military men to
express support for government policies, the question arises as to
whether critics within the military should be forbidden from also ex-
pressing their views. If so, then the opposite effect from the "man on
the white horse" danger may occur, that is, the military may be
used not merely to carry out the administration's policies, but actively
to support the particular political policies of the existing government.
President Johnson's heavy scheduling of speeches, many of them with
strong political overtones, at military installations in 1967 and early
1968 is an indication of the political danger of associating the mili-
tary too closely with the partisan policies of an administration. 14 2 Some
of the anti-military feeling which arose during this period of the Viet-
nam War may be attributable to the close identification of the military
with pro-Vietnam War policies and the feeling that the military had gone
beyond a nonpartisan role of merely executing policy to become a
139. Shearer, supra note 137, at 460.
140. E.g., Senator William Fulbright made four speeches on the Senate floor
in December 1969 concerning the public relations activities of the military establish-
ment. Id. at 455. See also "Colonel's Lecture Tours Challenged by Fulbright,"
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1969, at 3, col. 6, describing program which has sent an esti-
mated 175 colonels on lecture tours since 1948.
141. See generally H. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES IN THE WORLD WAR
(1927); H. LAVINE & J. WECHSLER, WAR PROPAGANDA AND THE UNrIED STATES (1940);
AMERICA'S WEAPONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (R. Summers ed. 1951); T. QUALTER,
PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (1962).
142. See Sherman, Buttons, supra note 136, at 17.
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spokesman for certain political policies in which it had a vested interest.
Guidelines for activities by critical servicemen are difficult to draw,
but it appears both unrealistic and inequitable to permit Howe-type sup-
pression of all such criticism based on the "man on a white horse" ra-
tionale. However, there appear to be valid reasons to distinguish be-
tween high ranking officers and all other servicemen, and allow "muzz-
ling" of the former but not of the latter.
First, high-ranking officers, by definition, speak from positions
of authority. It is difficult for the public to disassociate the speaker
from his position in the military. On the other hand, very few would
mistake a second lieutenant or enlisted man as speaking for the Army.
Second, high-ranking officers serve voluntarily, and if they find them-
selves no longer able to support administration policies, they are free, as
most of the dissenting generals have done, to retire and to speak freely
as a civilian. Most enlisted men and many junior officers are serving
either directly or indirectly as the result of the Selective Service Act.
They cannot resign until their mandatory tour is over, and therefore a
ban on critical speech effectively silences them for the duration of their
military obligation. Third, the publicly-expressed views of high-rank-
ing military men may have some effect upon their subordinates, given
the military emphasis upon obedience to superiors and the well-known
fact that policy comes from high commands. It is much less likely that
enlisted men will feel constrained to adopt the views of a second lieu-
tenant or another enlisted man expressed at an off-post rally, and this
is especially so if the views are not in conformity with official policies.
b) The Inadequacy of the Rationale
It appears that the Court of Military Appeals' easy reliance upon
the "man on a white horse" danger to justify article 88 "contemptuous
words" convictions and inferentially to justify article 133 "conduct un-
becoming an officer" convictions for critical speech, eschewing analy-
sis of the particular circumstances under which the conduct took place,
does not conform to the policies intended to be served by the "clear and
present danger" test. The "man on the white horse" rationale simply
does not provide a constitutionally sufficient basis for identifying a mili-
tary interest clearly paramount to a serviceman's First Amendment
rights.
The Supreme Court's reliance in Dennis upon an overpowering
governmental interest in national security as sufficient to overcome the
absence of an immediate danger has been subjected to considerable
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criticism, 14' and in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions such
as Yates v. United States14 and Brandenburg v. Ohio,'45 it is of limited
application today. But even so, the danger protected against in Dennis,
in light of the evidence presented of a well-organized Communist con-
spiracy ready to take illegal action when the time was ripe,' 46 seems con-
siderably more serious than the problematic dangers said to arise from
Lt. Howe's conduct under the "man on a white horse rationale." The
Dennis holding was further limited by the trial judge's instruction that
the language must be found to go beyond teaching and advocacy to be
reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite to unlawful action,1
47
a distinction deemed critical by the Supreme Court in Yates.' 48 This
instruction was not given in Howe.
One significant aspect of the Howe decision should be mentioned.
The court not only failed to weigh interests in terms of the circumstances
that afternoon in El Paso, but also failed to consider the type of disci-
plinary action taken by the military in view of other alternatives. As
previously mentioned, high-ranking dissenters, many of whose public
criticisms appear much more aggravated than Lt. Howe's, have never
been court-martialled-with the sole exception of General Billy Mitch-
ell. All have either been permitted to resign or have been involuntarily
discharged or deactivated. There is the doctrine that the availability of
alternatives involving less serious restrictions on First Amendment rights
precludes suppression through use of a more serious restriction, and this
doctrine has become an important element of First Amendment law.' 49
Less restrictive alternatives such as reprimand, removal from his posi-
tion, transfer, or dismissal 5 ' were readily available in the Howe case,
143. See, e.g., Chafee, Thirty-five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 KA.. L. REv.
1 (1952); Gorfinkel & Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present
Danger Rule, 39 CALF. L. REv. 475 (1951); Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the
Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1167 (1950).
144. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
145. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
146. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497-98, 510-11 (1951).
147. Id. at 511-12.
148. 354 U.S. at 320-22 (1957). See also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
149. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); cf. Tinker v. Des
Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
150. Transfer to another post has frequently been used in the Vietnam War pe-
riod for dissenters and anti-war organizers. See cases of Pvt. Joseph Miles, organizer
of GI's United Against the War in Vietnam at Ft. Bragg, suddenly reassigned to
Alaska, Washington Daily News, June 5, 1969, at 3, col. 3; Sgt. Michael Sanders,
honor guard at tomb of unknown soldier, reassigned to Vietnam despite physical im-
pairments and only 7 months left in tour, after criticizing war in newspaper inter-
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTSJanuary 19711
and no reasons were ever provided to show that they were inadequate to
achieve the military disciplinary objectives.
The Court of Military Appeals expressly held in Howe that intent
was not a necessary element of speaking "contemptuous words" against
the President under article 88.11 Thus an officer can be convicted for
speaking contemptuous words, even in a political context, without hav-
ing intended the words to be personally disrespectful or contemptuous.
This contrasts with the Supreme Court's previous holding in Garrison v.
Louisiana15 2 that the New York Times v. Sullivan153 rationale applies
to criminal libel of public officials, and therefore, conviction is only con-
stitutional if there is proof of actual malice. The military offense of
"contemptuous words," like the civilian offense of criminal libel, pro-
vides a restraint upon the right to make certain types of public state-
ments. Criminal libel laws have been justified as necessary to curb
libelous statements which might lead to public disorder,' while the
"contemptuous words" offense is claimed to be necessary to prevent un-
due military involvement in politics. Since both the military and civilian
offenses forbid certain speech on policy grounds focusing on a danger
perceived in the words themselves, both run the risk of unconstitutional-
ity under First Amendment precedents. The Supreme Court, in Gar-
rison, recognized this problem and thus imposed the New York Times
requirement of intentional malice to limit the scope of criminal libel.
In contrast, according to the holding in Howe, the "contemptuous
words" themselves (which may not even reach the level of libel) can
be punished without intent, much less actual malice.
view, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1969, at 3, col. 3 (late city ed.). Punitive transfers, es-
pecially when they put the individual in a position of danger and appear to be moti-
vated by expression of criticisms, raise First Amendment questions, but courts have
been reluctant to interfere with duty assignments. See Saunders v. Westmoreland, 2
SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3157 (D.D.C. May 26, 1969). But see Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct.
54 (1968). Dismissal also involves substantial military discretion, but must comply
with regulations and if damaging to the officer, such as a less than honorable dis-
charge or dismissal of a career officer nearing retirement, may be subject to challenge.
See note 98 supra. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Schlanger v. Seamons,
No. 5481 (Oct. 19, 1970), 39 U.S.L.W. 3167 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1970) (college student
challenging dropping from ROTC due to campus and civil rights activities and induc-
tion as an enlisted man).
151. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 179-80, 37 C.M.R. 429, 443-44
(1967).
152. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
153. 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
154. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); City of Chicago v. Lambert,
197 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. 1964). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (statute forbidding "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in a street or public place").
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B. The Daniels and Harvey Additions' 55
The next First Amendment case decided by the Court of Mil-
tary Appeals during the Vietnam period was United States v. Daniels,
156
decided in July, 1970 with a companion case, United States v. Har-
vey.' 57 Daniels-Harvey involved dissent by servicemen directed at Viet-
nam war policies, but unlike the Howe case, the dissent was expressed
privately rather than publicly, by enlisted men rather than officers, was
directed towards fellow servicemen rather than civilians, and was aimed
at a particular goal rather than general political objectives.
George Daniels and William Harvey both volunteered for the Ma-
rine Corps, and they met for the first time in July, 1967, when they were
assigned to an infantry training regiment at Camp Pendleton, California.
Like many marine units at this period, this unit had a high proportion of
blacks, and many of them were discontented. Many of these marines
had voluntarily enlisted in the Marine Corps under a promise of aviation
or other noninfantry assignments, but they had been "washed out" of
the military training schools for these assignments because of poor aca-
demic performance. In each case they found themselves at Camp
Pendleton being retrained as infantrymen for probable assignment in
Vietnam. Some had sought some form of administrative relief at their
previous posts, but they had been told their requests must wait until
they arrived at Camp Pendleton. At Camp Pendleton they were told it
was too late for consideration. The company commander recognized
all of this when he described the unit as a group of "people who didn't
want to be there, which is a particularly susceptible group of peo-
ple.", 58
Daniels and Harvey became friends after finding that they shared
a common interest in the Black Muslim religion. Daniels had been ex-
pressing his ideas to other marines for some time, often saying that Viet-
nam was a white man's war, that black men should not fight there, and
that the black and white races should be separated by force because
they could not get along. Shortly after his arrival at Camp Pendleton,
he told his commanding officer of his religious views and his opposi-
tion to the Vietnam War and requested either a change in his occupa-
tion specialty or discharge as a conscientious objector. The commander
155. When discussing the details of Daniels and Harvey, the author speaks in part
from knowledge derived during his association with the cases while serving as civilian de-
fense counsel on both appeals.
156. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970).
157. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970).
158. Transcript of trial at 260, United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42
C.M.R. 131 (1970).
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asked him "not to spread this philosophy throughout the company"' 59
and said that he would see what he could do, but apparently he took
no action on Daniels's request.
On July 27, 1967, Daniels and Harvey, together with some fifteen
other Marines, mostly black, were sitting together under a tree after the
noon meal in the field. Someone had a morning newspaper with head-
lines about the riots in Detroit that were going on at the time, and some-
how the conversation turned from the riots to Vietnam. Daniels
spoke a good deal, repeating what he had often said before: Vietnam
was a whiteman's war; black men should not fight there and then have
to come back and fight the white man in the United States. He also
said that he already had instituted the procedure to see the command-
ing officer (called "request mast") about not going to Vietnam, and
then he asked "who all was going with him." Harvey, on the other hand,
said little, but he seemed to express agreement with Daniels. After the
discussion, which lasted about 10 minutes, Harvey and another black
marine informed the staff sergeant that they and a number of other
marines wanted to request mast and, on the sergeant's instructions, Har-
vey made a list of the marines requesting mast.
The next morning at formation, the names were called and four-
teen black marines fell out and marched over to the command office.
The commanding officer refused to talk to them personally, but the
gunnery sergeant interviewed each one; after warning them that they
might be subject to mutiny charges, he sent them back to their unit.
About six of them, including Daniels and Harvey, stated that they had
requested mast because they did not want to go to Vietnam; two said
they wanted hardship discharges; and most others asked for changes in
their occupation specialties.
There were no further incidents after the request mast, but during
the next few weeks Daniels, Harvey, and other members of the unit were
called in for interrogation by agents of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
The members of the unit, including Daniels and Harvey, completed their
training and were graduated in the middle of August. As the men were
leaving for various assignments, some to Vietnam, some not, Daniels
and Harvey were arrested and charged with conspiracy to violate title
18, section 2387 of the United States Code, a section of the 1940 Smith
Act which forbids attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, and
refusal of duty by a member of the Naval forces of the United States.
Daniels was convicted by a general court-martial under this sec-
159. Id. at 259.
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tion for making certain statements to eight other black marines either
in informal discussions in the barracks or during the afternoon discus-
sion after the Detroit riots. 160 He was sentenced to a dishonorable dis-
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to the lowest en-
listed grade, and confinement at hard labor for 10 years. Harvey was
acquitted of the charges under section 2387. Nonetheless he was con-
victed of the lesser included offense of making "disloyal statements...
with design to promote disloyalty among the troops" in violation of ar-
ticle 134. He was sentenced to 6 years confinement at hard labor,
a dishonorable discharge, forefiture of all pay and allowances, and re-
duction to the lowest enlisted grade. Navy boards of review subse-
quently affirmed both convictions on all specifications, but reduced the
confinement to 4 years for Daniels and 3 years for Harvey.
1 6
1
1. THE DECISIONS OF THE BOARDS OF REvIEw
One of the principal assignments of error before the boards of re-
view was the vagueness and overbreadth of the offenses. Section 2387
was enacted in 1940 as part of the Smith Act'62 (which is usually
known for the more frequently used section which makes it a crime to
advocate overthrowing the government by force or violence).' 63 The
constitutionality of section 2387 has never been tested before the Su-
preme Court, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1943 had up-
held its constitutionality against charges of vagueness and overbreadth
in Dunne v. United States.16 4  There the court noted the similarity in
160. Daniels was charged with making a number of statements to each of the
eight marines similar to the statements allegedly made to Pvt. Clarence Ellis Jones:
"(1) The black and white races should be separated. (2) The black man had no coun-
try and that the black and white races should be separated. (3) The only way to
separate the races was by force and violence. (4) The white man was brainwashing
the black man and that the white man and the black man could never get along.
(5) He (Pvt. Jones) should not go to Vietnam because the war was the white
man's war and when the black man returned he would have to fight the white man any-
way. (6) To request mast and inform the Company Commander that he (Pvt. Jones)
would not go to Vietnam or fight in the Vietnam War." Transcript of trial, Appellate
Exhibit 4, Charge 1, Specification 2, United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42
C.M.R. 131 (1970).
161. United States v. Daniels, - C.M.R. - (NCM 68-1733, May 15, 1969);
Harvey, 40 C.M.R. 941 (1969).
162. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, §§ 1, 3, 5, 54 Stat. 670-71 (1940) was the
basis for 18 U.S.C. § 2387 (1964).
163. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, §§ 2, 3, 5, 54 Stat. 670-71, which was the fore-
runner of 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). Section 2385 also forbids publishing or dis-
tributing printed matter advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and
organizing any group which teaches or advocates violent overthrow.
164. 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943).
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language to the Espionage Act of 1917,165 previously upheld in
Schenck v. United States,166 Frohwerk v. United States,167 and Debs v.
United States. 1 8 Daniels, however, argued that Dunne was not disposi-
tive of the issue. First, he noted that section 2387 seems not to have
been used since World War II, probably because of doubts as to its con-
stitutionality when there has been no declared war. The United States
Code Annotated shows only four cases involving prosecutions under
section 2387; all of them were Second World War cases, and all in-
volved persons advocating the overthrow of the government by force.""9
Section 2387 was only resurrected by the military for use against dis-
senters in the Vietnam War period,' 70 an application which Daniels ar-
gued was far different from its purpose in the World War II cases.
Second, Daniels noted that constitutional law precedents have re-
quired stricter standards of definition since Dunne was decided in 1943,
and thus under current precedents, the language of section 2387 is over-
broad and vague.17' The terms of the act, such as "loyalty" and "dis-
loyalty," are subjective terms without adequate legal definition to limit
them to conduct that is outside the protection of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the statute makes no allowance for the circumstances un-
der which an utterance is made; thus it is not limited to situations where
there is a clear and present danger of unlawful action involving incite-
165. Id. at 140-41 citing Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1964).
166. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
167. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
168. 249 U.S. 211 (1918).
169. Pelley v. Botkin, 152 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Dunne v. United States,
138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. Gancy, 54 F. Supp. 755 (D. Minn.
1944), afj'd, 149 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 767 (1945) (applying
to a collateral matter involving the Alien Registration Act); United States v. McWil-
liams, 54 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1944).
170. The Navy used section 2387 in court-martialling two men for statements
made while they were in "sanctuary" in a church in Hawaii. United States v. Gray,
20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970); United States v. Met, NCM 69-0987 (1969).
The Army, however, has tended to use the "disloyal statements" specification in court-
martialling dissenters. Amick & Stolte, 40 C.M.R. 720 (1969) (distributing anti-war
leaflets on post); Bell, 40 C.M.R. 807 (1969) (making statements while in sanctuary
indicating resignation from the service).
171. See testimony of Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark, H. REP. No. 12047,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966) ("whoever. . . advises, counsels, urges, or solicits another
to give or deliver any money, property or thing. . . intended for delivery to any hostile
power," etc.) probably violated free speech because it reaches advising, counseling,
urging and soliciting. Congressman Don Edwards testified that it was unconstitutionally
vague and a "threat" to open and free debate about foreign policy. ANNUAL REPORT
FOR THE YEAR 1966 OF THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACITITIES, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., 36-37 (1967).
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ment to action, rather than mere advocacy, as required by the Supreme
Court in Yates v. United States,172 another Smith Act case.
The Navy Board of Review, in reliance on the World War 11 cases
which had upheld the constitutionality of section 2387,3 rejected
Daniels's objections as to vagueness and overbreadth. If found that the
words used in section 2387 were sufficiently explicit to give fair notice
of the conduct prohibited, and that the requirement of a specific intent
"to interfere with, impair, and influence loyalty, morale, and disci-
pline"' 74 sufficiently limited the scope of such conduct to prevent con-
flict with First Amendment rights.
Harvey, who was convicted of the lesser included offense of mak-
ing "disloyal statements," had a somewhat stronger argument as to
vagueness and overbreadth. Unlike section 2387 which couples the
general term "disloyalty" with the more particular and therefore limit-
ing phrase "insubordination, mutiny, and the refusal of duty,"' 75 the
"disloyal statements" offense (which is one of the "specifications" found
in the Manual for article 134), provides no such inherent limitations.
Thus Harvey argued in his brief before the board of review:
The Manual for Courts-Martial provides only two unhelpful sen-
tences in the section entitled "discussion" under the "disloyal state-
ments" specification of Article 134. The first sentence states that
certain disloyal statements which may not constitute an offense un-
der §§2385, 2387, or 2388 may "be punishable as conduct to the
prejudice of good order and discipline or conduct reflecting discredit
upon the armed forces." The second sentence states: "Examples
are public utterances designed to promote disloyalty or disaffec-
tion among troops, as praising the enemy, attacking the war aims of
the United States, or denouncing our form of government." It
strikes one immediately that these examples, which are not legal
terms of art and have no judicial gloss to aid in definition, are also
so vague that the serviceman still has little guidance as to what is
criminal and so overbroad that they could include statements
which are obviously protected by the First Amendment. For ex-
ample, in the case of "praising the enemy," who is the enemy?
Is it a country with whom the United States is engaged in a de-
clared war? If not, how is a serviceman to know which countries
might be considered "the enemy"? Is North Vietnam the enemy?
Russia? Communist China? Cuba? East Germany? Poland?
Syria and Egypt? What constitutes "praise"? Can one applaud
the peace efforts of the Soviet Union in the Indian-Pakistan dis-
172. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
173. The court especially relied upon Pelley v. Botkin, 152 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
174. United States v. Daniels, - C.M.R. - (NCM 68-1733, May 15, 1969).
175. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, if applicable, would narrow the meaning of
"disloyalty" to characteristics possessed by the other enumerated terms. BLAcK's LAW
DIcIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951).
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pute? Can he praise the educational programs of Premier Cas-
tro? Can he comment favorably on the tenacity of Ho Chi Minh?
Article 104 states, "Enemy imports citizens as well as members of
military organizations and does not restrict itself to the enemy
government or its armed forces." Is one, therefore, forbidden not
only from praising the government but also the people? Is it a
crime to praise the spirit of the North Vietnamese while denouncing
their government?
The example of "attacking the war aims of the United States"
is equally confusing. Is it an attack on the war aims of the U.S.
to call for escalation of the war? To urge that we pull out of Viet-
nam? Can a serviceman be sure what the war aims of the United
States are? Is the aim of our present Vietnam policy to insure a
popularly elected government in Vietnam or an anti-Communist
government? Do statements calling for a coalition government
constitute a crime? "Denouncing our form of government" is simi-
larly unhelpful. What is meant by "our form of government?"
Is it the Constitutional framework? Can a soldier advocate aboli-
tion of the electoral college established in the Constitution? Can he
urge taking away constitutional powers of the Supreme Court or
denounce the school desegregation decision? What elements are so
basic to our "form of government" that they cannot be denounced-
federalism, capitalism, democracy, welfare state programs, the
draft?1
76
Harvey also argued that there was only a meager judicial gloss to assist
in interpretation and it failed to provide clear guidelines that would
prevent the term "disloyal" from embracing protected First Amend-
ment speech.
177
As in Daniels, the Harvey board of review also rejected the vague-
ness and overbreadth arguments. It found that the terms of the specifi-
cation contained in the Manual for Courts-Martial under article 134
were sufficiently clear to apprise one of what was considered criminal
conduct, and that Harvey's statements were not constitutionally protected
speech. Like the board in Daniels, the Harvey board did not come to
176. Brief for Appellant at 21-23, Harvey, 40 C.M.R. 941 (1969).
177. E.g., McQuaid, 5 C.M.R. 525 (1952), upheld the conviction of a PFC
for posting a statement on an outside door at an Alaska air base praising the
Soviet Union and criticizing both the United States and "Wall Street Imperialism."
The court characterized these statements as "clearly disloyal and disaffecting as they
present a completely false picture of our defense effort, its aims and objectives, tend to
discourage faithful service to the country by members of the armed forces and unjustly
malign our economic system." Id. at 530. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452 (1954), up-
held the conviction of an American prisoner of war held by the North Koreans
for sending a letter to his hometown newspaper condemning alleged use of bac-
teriological warfare by the United States as a "deliberate attempt to cause the
American people to alienate or diminish their affection for, belief in, and good will
toward their government or those in authority, thereby to stimulate 'such a revulsion
among the American people that the perfidious administration would be forced to' alter
its policy." Id. at 483.
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grips with the overbreadth problem in terms of a possible chilling effect
on First Amendment rights, and since in both cases the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals' grants of review omitted the assignments of error based
on vagueness and overbreadth, those issues stand as decided by the two
boards of review.
2. THE DECISIONs OF THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
Although the Court of Military Appeals' decisions in Daniels
78
and Harvey17 are lengthy, they leave a number of questions concerning
servicemen's First Amendment rights unsettled. The court, in an opin-
ion by Chief Judge Quinn, with Judge Ferguson concurring in the result
only, reversed both convictions because of instructional error. It found
that the law officer in Daniels had failed to instruct that the court-mar-
tial members must find that Daniel's statements had a natural tend-
ency to lead to insubordination, disloyalty, or refusal of duty. In
Harvey the law officer failed to instruct that the statements must be
found to have been disloyal to the United States, not merely disloyal to
the Marine Corps. In reversing, however, it found both Daniels and
Harvey guilty of the offense of solicitation to disobey orders (carrying
a maximum sentence of 4 months) which, with questionable sup-
port,8 0 it found to be a lesser included offense of the Smith Act allega-
tion. Most significantly, however, the court indicated in broad dicta
that the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions without
violation of their First Amendment rights.
a) The Scope of the Serviceman's First Amendment Rights
In Daniels-Harvey the Court of Military Appeals reaffirmed the
applicability of the First Amendment to servicemen. In its strongest
language to date, the court stated:
The right to believe in a particular faith or philosophy and the
right to express one's opinions or to complain about real or
imaginary wrongs are legitimate activities in the military com-
munity as much as they are in the civilian community. . . If the
statements and the intent of the accused, as established by the evi-
dence, constitute no more than commentary as to the tenets of his
178. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 536, 42 C.M.R. 131, 138
(1970).
179. United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 546, 42 C.M.R. 141, 148 (1970).
180. In a habeas corpus action filed by Daniels after exhausting his military ap-
pellate remedies, he argued that the offense of solicitation to disobey orders is not a
lesser included offense of the section 2387 offense charged and therefore that he
did not have notice of such lesser included offense under the section 2387 charge.
Daniels v. Laird, Civil No. HC 140-70 (D.D.C. 1970).
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faith or declarations of private opinion as to the social and political
state of the United States, he is guilty of no crime.18'
b) The Court's View of "Clear and Present Danger"
In Daniels, the court adopted the analytical scheme used by the
Supreme Court in Hartzel v. United States'8 2 wherein the Court found
two elements necessary for a conviction under the similar Espionage
Act of 1917:183 a "subjective element" that the defendant possessed
the requisite intent, and an "objective element" that there was a clear and
present danger that the activities would bring about the substantive evils
proscribed by the statute. In reviewing the record, the court found suf-
ficient evidence of both elements. As to Daniels's intent, the court
found that although his statements to other marines may have been ex-
pressions of personal beliefs and grievances, the court-martial could
have found that "[h]is call for action in the form of a mass request
mast was a subtle and skillful way of leading the black troopers in the
company into insubordination and disloyolty."'184 The court empha-
sized that Daniels had addressed his statements specifically to other
blacks who were engaged in military training for possible Vietnam duty,
and that he propounded a racial doctrine that contemplated lack of
cooperation between the races. Unfortunately the court failed to recog-
nize that statements about separation of the races are standard Black
Muslim rhetoric which, nevertheless, do not affect countless Black Mus-
lims in their day-to-day dealings with whites.
In Daniels the Court of Military Appeals accepted the "clear and
present danger" test from the second "objective element" in the Hartzel
scheme, but it did not discuss the constitutional dimensions of the re-
quirement. Apparently it viewed the test as simply an element of the
section 2387 offense as suggested by Hartzel. Thus, the court indi-
cated its willingness to apply the test rather mechanically to the facts
with little consideration of the underlying policy interests involved.
At the beginning of the opinion, the court cited Howe for the gen-
eral proposition that certain speech is not protected by the Constitu-
181. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 532, 42 C.M.R. 131, 134 (1970).
182. 322 U.S. 680 (1944). Hartzell reversed a conviction of one who mailed 600
copies of a tract which strongly denounced the President, our English allies, and the
Jews when only twenty-two of the tracts had been sent to military men. The court
held that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1964).
184. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 535, 42 C.M.R. at 137.
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tion,18 5 and so it appears that it did not intend to break with the Howe
"clear and present danger" rationale. As has been discussed, how-
ever,'8 6 Howe was particularly influenced by the Dennis ad hoc' 87 bal-
ancing approach, and this resulted in a determination that certain gov-
emnment interests are of such importance that the "clear and present
danger" test is satisfied--despite the lack of immediacy in the danger
presented. The court's approach in Daniels was not so obviously an ad
hoc balancing determination, and apparently since "contemptuous
words" by an officer were not involved, the "man on a white horse" ra-
tionale was not raised. In Daniels, the court was persuaded that, under
the circumstances, both the loyalty and the obedience of the troops in-
volved were actually in immediate danger; it assumed without discus-
sion that these were sufficient government interests to overcome con-
flicting First Amendment rights.
c) Racial Rhetoric: A Clear and Present Danger?
The court's determination that there was sufficient evidence to
meet the "clear and present danger" test especially emphasized the
racial composition of the group to whom the statements were made and
the racial content of the statements themselves. The court noted that
the black marines were undergoing training to prepare them for duty in
Vietnam, that many "didn't want to be there," that they were a par-
ticularly "susceptible" group, and that they were aware of race riots
in large cities and were sensitive to tensions between blacks and
whites.18 8  In this context, the court found that "[t]he joinder of the
Vietnam War with racial violence in the cities was not mere rhetoric
or political hyperbole, but a call for refusal of duty."18
9
The court did recognize, however, that even if Daniels's statement
in such a situation could be considered inflammatory, a conclusion stren-
uously attacked by appellant, 9 0 nevertheless they were directed at only
one goal-that the men request mast through the normal procedures
established by the Marine Corps for presentation of grievances to the
commander. Daniels's statements called for action that is not only law-
185. Id. at 532, 42 C.M.R. at 134.
186. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
187. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
188. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 535, 42 C.M.R. 131, 137 (1970).
189. Id., 42 C.M.R. at 137.
190. Daniels's statements, as shown in the record, were generally low-keyed reci-
tations of Black Muslim teachings. There was no evidence that he was the type of
speaker who tended to excite his listeners.
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ful, but encouraged by the Marine Corps, and, in fact, this was the only
action which resulted from his statements. The court resolved this prob-
lem by finding that Daniels was really attempting to misuse the lawful
mast procedure. It found that his call for a request mast "did not con-
template reliance upon the ordinary and the usual reasons for separation
from the service or excuse from duty but depended upon the implied
force of the number of blacks who availed themselves of it."''
It is far from clear from the record that Daniels's acts were a mis-
use of the mast procedure. Some of the black marines, as Daniels was
well aware, had legitimate grounds for favorable personnel action, such
as a change in occupation specialty, reassignment, or discharge. Daniels
himself claimed to be a conscientious objector, and had his request
for assignment to noncombatant duties or discharge been processed, it
might have received favorable action. 192  Although there had been
talk among the troops about seeing the commander and avoiding Viet-
nam because it was a white man's war, there seems to have been equally
strong motivations of other types; most importantly, all the talk seemed
to contemplate using the appropriate mast procedures. Since enlisted
men have little technical knowledge of "[tihe ordinary and the usual
reasons for separation from the service or excuse from duty,"'93 they
usually have only hazy notions that certain kinds of problems and con-
ditions provide such grounds under the regulations. But they do know
that request mast is an appropriate means for raising such questions.
The fact that some strongly opposed the war and even that some may
have resolved not to fight in "a white man's war" should not necessarily
make an otherwise legal request for mast illegal.
Even if Daniels's statements were intended to coerce the com-
mander to grant personnel requests not justified under the regulations,
it is still doubtful that this posed a clear and present danger of disloyalty
and disobedience. Statutes,' regulations, 195 command directives, 9 '
191. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 534,, 42 C.M.R. 131, 137
(1970).
192. For discussion of the requirements of conscientious objector discharge, see
Sherman, Military Law, supra note 1, at 505-26; Comment, God, the Army, and Judi-
cial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1968).
193. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 535, 42 C.M.R. 131, 137 (1970).
194. UCMJ art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1964). See the discussion in R. RIVKIN, G.I.
RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: THE DRAFTEE'S GUIDE TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAW 180-99
(1970). See also 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1964) (right to communicate with members of
Congress).
195. Army Reg. 20-1 ch. 3 (Aug. 22, 1968).
196. MARINE CORPS MANUAL ch. 1, § 1701, "Request Mast."
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and decisions of the Court of Military Appeals' 97 have all emphasized
that servicemen's channels to their commander should remain open for
presentation of grievances, even if the grievances are unjustified, un-
founded, or raised in bad faith. The reason for such a policy, quite
apart from the possible constitutional implications, is that the military
has found as a practical matter that it is best to provide an opportunity
for men to get things off their chests. It is far better to encourage them
to bring their complaints to the commander rather than to allow them to
fester or grow outside the knowledge of the command. 198 This does not
mean, of course, that a commander must permit himself to be pressured
improperly by his men; he has full authority to establish the form and
nature of the mast. For example he may require, as did Daniels's
commander, that the men be interviewed one at a time rather than as a
group. Similarly, although a commander need not justify his orders or
government policies to his men, he must at least consider their com-
plaints concerning those orders or policies.
197. See cases stating that UCMJ art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1964), permitting
presentation of grievances to commander, provides a genuine remedy for servicemen:
Dale v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 254, 41 C.M.R. 254 (1970); Walker v. United
States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 41 C.M.R. 247 (1970). In Wolfson, 36 C.M.R. 722,
728 (1966), an army board of review reversed the article 133 conviction of a
doctor who complained to General Westmoreland during an inspection tour. The
court stated: "Complaining is indulged in by enlisted men and officers of all grades
and rank. Complaints may be registered on any topic and frequently are. 'Bitch-
ing,' to use the vernacular, may be expressed in gutter talk or in well articulated
phrases and has frequently been developed into a fine art. . . . The right to complain
is undoubtedly within the protection of the first amendment of the Constitution of
the United States guaranteeing freedom of speech." See also Schatten v. United
States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel Gaston v. Cassidy, 296
F. Supp. 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
198. In Marine Corps Order 5216.10A (Aug. 16, 1968), the Chief of Staff of the
Marine Corps emphasized that "[clommanders are required to endeavor to remove
those causes which make for misunderstanding and dissatisfaction" and that "the
right of an individual to request mast with his designated commanding officer is guar-
anteed . . . without fear of prejudice." On April 22, 1969, following racial trouble at
Camp Lejeune, N.C., an ad hoc committee reported: "In the opinion of the black ma-
rine, he has no official channel available to him by and through which he can obtain
redress for complaints of discrimination. In essence request mast is not accomplishing
the purpose for which it was intended." N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1969, at 67, col. 5
(late city ed.). After race riots at a number of Marine bases, the Marine Corps Com-
mandant issued a message on Sept. 3, 1969, ordering that "no harassment, either real
or implied, will be permitted to occur at any level between the individual requesting
mast and the commander. . . . I want to insure that channels of communication be-
tween every marine and his commanding officer are open, that every marine under-
stands that they are open, and that legitimate grievances will receive sympathetic con-
cideration and rapid response." N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1969, at 39, col. 4 (late
city ed.).
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If mast is to achieve its stated purposes, it must be contemplated
that men may be angry in requesting it and that they will sometimes al-
ready seem to have their minds made up, perhaps even to do unlawful
acts. Further, when they have a common grievance, they may wish to
actively encourage others to join them in the request mast to make their
case stronger. But so long as they continue to utilize the mast proce-
dures, it appears that they are willing to abide by lawful procedures.
The commander is still in a position to control the situation. Naturally,
a request for mast accompanied by disruptive or threatening conduct
might create a clear and present danger to the military, but that is an
entirely different situation.
This request mast incident in Daniels seems to be a good example
of a situation not yet ripe enough to constitute a clear and present
danger. None of the men had received their post-training orders,
whether to Vietnam or elsewhere. The time selected would seem to be
an especially appropriate one for utilizing the military grievance pro-
cedures while the festering and potentially explosive complaints could
still be handled rationally and remedies were still possible. The fact
that Daniels may have persuaded some of the men to view their dissatis-
factions in terms of race and opposition to the war was understandably
disturbing to the command, but there still seems to have been time and
means to deal with them adequately.
Professor Paul Freund has observed that the "clear and present
danger" limitation on First Amendment rights may only be "[a]ppro-
priate where the harm is such that a corrective could not be sought
through countervailing speech."' 199 In this case, the men were still
seeking redress through appropriate grievance channels,2"' and the
199. FREUND, supra note 10, at 44.
200. Testimony from the record concerning the request mast is as follows:
Private White:
Q. Did you go over to the company office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could you tell me who you saw?
A. Well, I didn't get to see the Captain. I saw the staff sergeant who was there.
Q. What took place?
A. He told me that he was going to run me up for mutiny, and I asked him,
"I just came to talk about it. Not to spread mutiny."
Q. Then what took place?
A. Well, he threw me out of the office, sir. Transcript, supra note 158, at 287.
Private Jones:
Q. Did you tell him [the sergeant] the reason why you were there?
A. I told him I was going to refuse to go and fight over in Vietnam because
it was a white man's war, sir.
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command still had reasonable means of dealing with the situation avail-
able. Subsequent events confirm the conclusion that there was no clear
and present danger at the time of the request mast since there were
no further incidents, and when Daniels and Harvey were finally ar-
rested after graduation, the men involved were preparing to go to their
new duty assignments.
d) The Lack of Interest Analysis
In applying the "clear and present danger" test in Daniels, the
Court of Military Appeals did not clearly articulate the interests in-
volved on each side. Presumably it viewed the Government's interest
in the terms of the statute itself, that is, the protection of the Marine
Corps against insubordination, disloyalty and refusal of duty; but it did
not feel it necessary to discuss the scope and dimensions of those in-
terests. It seems to have viewed the countervailing interests solely as
Daniels's right under the First Amendment to free speech without con-
sidering the dimensions of that right. Its tacit assumption that the
"clear and present danger" test can be applied simply by focusing on
the possible results of the conduct leaves a great deal to be desired.
Professor Freund has written, in an often-quoted comment on the test:
Even where it is appropriate, the clear-and-present-danger test is an
oversimplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number
of factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison
with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; the
availability of more moderate controls than those the state has im-
posed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or ac-
tivity is launched. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase
"clear and present danger," or how closely we hyphenate the words,
they are not a substitute for the weighing of values.
201
Except for the element of specific intent, the court paid little at-
tention to these values. For example, the court specifically consid-
ered two statements made by Daniels on which charges were based:
(1) a reference to another black marine as an "Uncle Tom" and (2) a
remark to another marine that he should not follow a sergeant's instruc-
Q. Did he explain to you why you should go?...
A. No, he told me what-if I don't go, what would happen.
Q. Now, has it ever been explained to you why it is not a white man's war and
why you should go?...
A. He told me I-one of the reasons that we were over there was because if we
don't stop Communism there, it will spread throughout other countries, so we
had to stop it there.
Q. Did he explain to you that it was not a white man's war?
A. He didn't explain it to me, but he told me it wasn't. Transcript, supra note
158, at 196-97.
201. FRBuND, supra note 10, at 44.
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tions to get a haircut. It stated that the "Uncle Tom" comment was it-
self grounds for conviction under section 2387 because "in appropriate
circumstances, insult, derision, or coarse epithet can be as effective a
cause of insubordination, disloyalty, and refusal of duty as direct in-
citement. '20 2  It also found actionable the remark about the haircut
on the ground that from all the evidence, the
court-martial could reason that urging [the marine] to disobey the
order to get a hair cut [sic] was an integral part of accused's inten-
tion and effort to influence [him] to disobedience and disloyalty.20 3
Although the court says that these statements created a danger of
disobedience, refusal of duty, and disloyalty, it appears unlikely, even
based upon its reading of the record, that the court seriously believed
that disobedience or refusal of duty was likely to follow. The remarks
were made in informal discussions, and it was admitted that they were
made at least in part in jest and in the spirit of give-and-take surround-
ing barracks-room arguments. Nothing in the record indicated that
either marine ever had any inclination to follow Daniels's advice or was
affected by his words, and in fact, no disobedience or refusal of duty
resulted.
What the court actually seems to be concerned about is not the
possibility of disobedience or refusal of duty but of "disloyalty." It
did not seem so much concerned that the marines to whom Daniels
made the "Uncle Tom" and "haircut" remarks would be led into "dis-
loyalty" in the sense of treason (the record provides little support for
such an assumption). Rather, it was concerned in the sense of a lessen-
ing of proper military attitudes, willingness to cooperate fully, and
espirit de corps. The Government's interest in protecting against dis-
obedience, refusal of duty, and disloyalty is obvious, but its interest in
shielding its men from speech which might affect their "loyalty" in the
sense of proper military attitudes is more questionable. Despite the ob-
vious concern of a commander who feels that the morale and espirit de
corps of his men are diminishing because of statements made to them by
a fellow serviceman, it is not so obvious that the military should be
allowed to deal with this problem by court-martialling the individual who
made the statements. This question poses profound issues as to the
function and role of the military in our democracy. The military interest
in insulating its men from speech that might affect their attitudes and
morale is clearly in conflict with the interest expressed by the First
202. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 535, 42 C.M.R. 131, 138 (1970).
203. Id. at 536, 42 C.M.R. at 138.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
January 1971J FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Amendment and our democratic tradition that a "free trade in ideas" is
the "best test of truth.
2 0 4
e) Social Interests in Free Speech within the Military
A military whose members are sealed-off from potentially criti-
cal or unfavorable speech in the interest of maintaining high morale
and efficiency may very well constitute a serious danger to the Ameri-
can democratic and constitutional system. A military isolated from
political debate and the winds of change can become a repressive force,
out of touch with the values and ideals of the civilian society. Further-
more, a military which attempts to deny conscripted servicemen the right
to engage in the political and social debates of the country is likely to en-
counter resistance and dissent which can by its very existence adversely
affect their efficiency and the military's ability to provide for the defense
of the nation. In a day when members of the military are better edu-
cated than ever before and persuasion has become a recognized instru-
ment of social control within the military,20 5 it appears unrealistic to
attempt to exact strict attitudinal conformity from all servicemen.
The experience of our para-military forces, such as police and fire
departments, indicates that men can be permitted a wide latitude of
freedom as to their personal, political, and social beliefs and yet still
perform loyally on the job. That experience also shows that men can
function efficiently and bravely in jobs involving a high degree of per-
sonal danger without being subjected to rigid conformity as to beliefs
and attitudes. In fact, recent liberalization of rules concerning length
of hair, dress, 206 and basic training techniques 0 7 indicates a growing
recognition that in our highly specialized and technological military,
greater consideration must be given to personal liberties.
The Court of Military Appeals in Daniels never articulated the pre-
vailing societal interests in the preservation of free speech; rather it de-
204. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
205. See note 90 supra.
206. See Directive of Marine Corps Commandant permitting modified Afro hair-
cuts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1969, at 39, col. 4 (late city ed.), and subsequent hair and
dress liberalizations by other services, Army Times, Sept. 17, 1969, at 1, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, at 1, col. 4 (late city ed.). See also "Westmoreland Mutes
Reveille Bugler," N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 5 and "Humanizing the U.S.
Military" (cover story on Admiral Zumwalt), Time, Dec. 21, 1970, at 16; describing
reforms in treatment of servicemen.
207. Letter from Robert L. Stewart, Lt. Col., HQTRS, U.S. Army Training Center,
Ft. Ord, Cal., to Edward F. Sherman, May 5, 1970, concerning "merit reward sys-
tem"'instituted in Basic Combat Training at FL'Ord. "
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scribed Daniels's interest solely in terms of his individual right to free
speech. It viewed the competing interests as the right of a private to
say what he pleases on one hand against the military's right to self-
preservation (by preventing disobedience, refusal of duty, and disloy-
alty) on the other. It is not surprising that, with the interests stated in
this way, it found that the military interests were paramount. The court's
formulation of the interests involved recalls Justice Black's objection to
such stacked interest-balancing in his dissent in Barenblatt:
But even assuming what I cannot assume, that some balancing is
proper in this case, I feel that the Court after stating the test ignores
it completely. At most it balances the right of the Government to
preserve itself, against Barenblatt's right to refrain from revealing
Communist affiliations. Such a balance, however, mistakes the fac-
tors to be weighed. In the first place, it completely leaves out the
real interest in Barenblatt's silence, the interest of the people as a
whole in being able to join organizations, advocate causes and
make political "mistakes" without later being subjected to gov-
ernmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves.20 8
As Justice Black indicates, the identification and definition of the
interests involved, like the premises in a syllogism, are critical to the
outcome of the balancing test. Once one defines the military interest
as self-preservation and the free speech interest as simply the right
of an individual to speak, a finding in favor of the military is inevitable.
Alternatively, if the military's interest were to be viewed as simply the
rather remote threat of disobedience or possible deleterious affects on
the "loyalty" of servicemen and if Daniels's interest is seen as the pres-
ervation of critical comment necessary to a democratic society, then the
balance shifts considerably. Both formulations, of course, are overly
simplistic, but at least the latter begins to come to grips with the type
of policy analysis that is essential to First Amendment rights. This is
particularly true if the balancing test is to serve as more than a mechani-
cal syllogism cranking out an answer already ordained by the assump-
tions incorporated in the premises. The Daniels decision, unfortu-
nately, has something of this quality. Until the Court of Military Ap-
peals is willing to address the difficult policy issues squarely, military
free speech cases are likely to continue to confuse rather than en-
lighten.200
208. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
209. Daniels was also the subject of other litigation raising First Amendment
questions concerning military confinement of prisoners pending appeal. After he had
been confined almost two years and his military appeals had not yet been completed,
he was released from confinement pursuant to the newly-enacted article 57(d) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. This article permits commanders to defer confine-
ment pending completion of appeals. He was assigned to a unit at the Marine Corps
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b) Disloyal Statements in Harvey
The court's shorter opinion in Harvey also leaves a number of
First Amendment issues unresolved. The court opened with the conclu-
sion, not otherwise explained, that the error in Daniels in failing to in-
struct that the statements must have had a "natural tendency" to pro-
duce the forbidden consequences21 does not apply to the Harvey case
because Harvey was convicted of "disloyal statements" rather than the
section 2387 offense.211 The court also failed to consider whether there
was the degree of "immediacy" of danger which the "clear and present
danger" test requires. Apparently the court felt that the "clear and
present danger" requirement arose only as an element of the statutory
offense in Smith Act cases212 rather than from constitutional compul-
sions, 2 13 but this is surely a curious limitation of the test. Although the
"clear and present danger" formulation may have fallen into some dis-
favor with the Supreme Court in recent years,
214 it has been generally
recognized that tests such as "clear and present danger" or "balancing"
insure proper consideration of First Amendment policies in free speech
cases. The Court of Military Appeals decision in Harvey simply anal-
yzed the charges in terms of the elements of the military offense of
"disloyal statements;" that is, whether the statements made were disloyal
to the United States and were made with design to promote disloyalty.
In not considering whether the statements in fact constituted a "clear and
present danger" or had a "natural tendency" towards forbidden conse-
quences, the court failed to focus on the "immediacy" danger (which
Base, Quantico, Virginia, but after eight months, the commanding officer rescinded the
release and ordered him back into confinement. Daniels sought extraordinary relief
from the Court of Military Appeals on the grounds that the revocation resulted from
his filing a complaint against his immediate commander and expressing his Black
Muslim beliefs. The court found that, despite broad language in article 57(d) about a
commander's "sole discretion," a commander must have good reasons for revocation
and must provide an opportunity for the prisoner to submit contrary evidence, implying
that retaliation for filing a complaint or exercising free speech rights would be im-
proper. It found, however, that although the Commander disliked Daniels' "proselytyz-
ing [sic] and propagandizing," the revocation could have been properly based on five
occasions of unauthorized absence by Daniels. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
518, 42 C.M.R. 120 (1970). See also Collier v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 511,
42 C.M.R. 113 (1970).
210. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
211. United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970).
212. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
213. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) seems to suggest that
the finding that the words had a "natural tendency" to incite to unlawful action was
constitutionally compelled.
214. See generally Strong,, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From
Schenck to Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. Cr. REv. 41 (1969).
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has been required in varying degrees for 50 years since Schenck) 15 that
must be shown before speech can be made criminal.
The court betrayed not the slightest doubt that the military may
prosecute servicemen for making disloyal statements, saying: "The Viet-
nam war has evoked a vast outpouring of written and oral comment.
The language of many of the comments is poised on a thin line between
rhetoric and disloyalty to the United States."21  Citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,21 7 however, it went on to note that "[d]isagree-
with, or objection to, a policy of the Government is not necessarily in-
dicative of disloyalty to the United States.112 18  It cited as an example
the act of Captain Dale Noyd in refusing to obey an order to train fighter
pilots for Vietnam after being denied conscientious objector status or
discharge. 19 It concluded that Captain Noyd's refusal to obey could
possibly have had the effect of reducing the military effectiveness of the
United States in the Vietnam War, but that on the record of his court-
martial, he was not disloyal to the United States.2 2° Apparently this
was because Noyd "demonstrated a genuine dedication to the United
States as a political entity, but scruples of conscience about the Viet-
nam war compelled him to refuse to obey. ' 22 1  In contrast, the court
said, Harvey's statements could properly have been found to be dis-
loyal to the United States itself since he urged others not to go to
Vietnam when he could reasonably expect that they would soon be
transferred there.
It is difficult to find any basis for the court's distinction between
Harvey and Noyd. If, as the court said, Noyd's refusal to obey the
order reduced the military effectiveness of the United States in the Viet-
nam war surely the effect upon the United States was as great as
Harvey's relatively inconsequential statements about not going to Viet-
nam and requesting mast. Both Harvey and Noyd would seem to have
been "disloyal" to the United States in the sense that they indicated their
unwillingness to support the administration's policy on the war, and
"loyal" in the sense that they demonstrated a genuine concern for their
country and attempted to take action, in their own way, to contribute
to a change in the war policy. The court seems to be caught in the
215. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
216. United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 544, 42 C.M.R. 141, 146
(1970).
217. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
218. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 544, 42 C.M.R. at 146.
219. See United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 40 C.M.R. 195 (1969).
220. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 544, 42 C.M.R. at 146.
221. Id., 42 C.M.R. at 146.
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hopeless web of trying to label actions resulting from complex motiva-
tions as "loyal" and "disloyal" when the terms have no clearly definable
legal meaning and the distinction between them does not seem to eluci-
date the relevant policy considerations involved. The distinction be-
tween disloyalty to the military and disloyalty to the United States does
at least provide some limitation on the "disloyal statements" offense.
But, unfortunately, it provides little assistance in identifying and weigh-
ing the relevant interests involved in such free speech cases.
C. United States v. Gray: Reaffirming the 'Disloyalty to Country"
Distinction
The Court of Military Appeals's only "disloyal statements" case
since Harvey, United States v. Gray,222 decided in August, 1970, clearly
demonstrates the unsatisfactory nature of the analytical framework de-
veloped inHarvey for servicemen's speech prosecutions. Gray, a young
marine stationed in Hawaii, was convicted of making "disloyal state-
ments" on two occasions: the first, in a short handwritten note in a
unit log book addressed to the other members of his unit before he
went AWOL; the second, a two-page statement issued by him and an-
other marine at the University of Hawaii where they had taken "sanc-
tuary" with members of a peace group.
In the first note Gray said that he was leaving with hopes of going
to Canada and other foreign countries, that the Constitution of the
United States was a farce, that he was participating in "A Struggle for
Humanity," and that "we must all fight." '223 The second statement is-
sued from "sanctuary" described his gradual disenchantment with the
Marine Corps. It also called for an immediate end to the war, a volun-
teer army, abolition of article 134 of the UCMJ, liberalization of con-
scientious objector status, and a "greater say" by servicemen. It stated:
We can no longer cooperate with these practices or with the war in
Vietnam. We are not deserting; we are simply taking a stand to
help others like us. . . . This is where we stand, and we hope that
other men in the Armed Forces who know that we speak the truth
will stand with us.
224
The Court of Military Appeals cited Daniels and Harvey for the
amazing proposition that "disloyal statements" are not speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment and thus, with the constitutional issues
out of the way, it proceeded to determine whether the statements were
222. United States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970).
223. Id. app. A, at 69, 42 C.M.R. at -.
224. Id. app. B, at 70, 42 C.M.R. at -
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actually disloyal to the United States. It found that the statements
made in the log book were disloyal to the United States, but that the
statements in the "sanctuary" notice were not. Thus it reversed the con-
viction on the "sanctuary" statement and remanded for reassessment of
sentence. The court seems to have felt that the language in the log
book about hoping to go to Canada and that "we all must fight" evi-
denced "disloyalty" to country, while the emphasis upon denunciations
of the Marine Corps and the disavowal of desertion in the "sanctuary"
statement limited the "disloyalty" only to the military.
This distinction is not persuasive. Both statements were aimed pri-
marily at one target, the war in Vietnam, and their tone is not ap-
preciably different. The language about Canada and "we all must
fight" in the log book appears to be typical overblown rhetoric, espe-
cially since Gray made no attempt either to flee to Canada or forcibly to
resist. The distinction is even more difficult to sustain when one notes
that the statement in the log book was not likely to reach very many, if
any, servicemen, while the "sanctuary" statement was printed, distrib-
uted, and publicized in the media.
The disturbing aspect of the Court of Military Appeals' new pat-
tern for handling "disloyal statement" cases is not so much that the
"disloyal to the United States" test can result in inconsistent and ab-
surd distinctions, but that this test clearly disregards the First Amend-
ment issues involved. Disloyalty to the United States is simply an ele-
ment of the military offense; it provides no standards for making the
necessary constitutional judgments concerning First Amendment rights
as provided in such inquiries as the "clear and present danger" and
"balancing" tests and the "natural tendency" requirement. The Harvey
and Gray cases, with their perplexing distinctions between permissible
and nonpermissible disloyal statements, unfortunately never reach the
level of issue analysis necessary for resolution of the constitutional issues
involved.
Although the Court of Military Appeals' definitional approach in
Harvey and Gray does not provide a very satisfactory vehicle for con-
sidering the policies at stake in military speech cases, it has imposed a
significant limitation on the use of the "disloyal statements" offense by
the military. Clearly, merely critical statements about the military
or war policies are no longer to be considered disloyal to the United
States. If Captain Noyd's refusal to participate in activities associated
with the war and Gray's criticisms of the military and the war while
in "sanctuary" are not disloyal to the United States, then "disloyalty
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
January 1971]
to the United States" seems to require something close to treason, giving
aid to the enemy, or outright rejection of one's country. This narrow
definition of "disloyalty to the United States" should considerably limit
the ability of the military to punish servicemen for dissenting speech
under the "disloyal statements" specification.
M. Conclusion
Now that the Court of Military Appeals has reaffirmed its ap-
proach in Daniels-Harvey, it appears that the military courts do not
offer much hope in the immediate future for altering the present limi-
tations on servicemen's First Amendment rights. As a result the focus
may shift to the federal courts where a number of military free speech
cases are now pending on petitions for collateral review. Howe,
225
Levy,226 Daniels,2 27 and Stolte-Amick 228 have all filed federal court ac-
tions seeking review of their court-martial convictions which raise
questions concerning the vagueness and overbreadth of the military of-
fenses as well as the constitutionality of their convictions.
Application of the First Amendment to the military is still a de-
veloping area of the law, but much more careful attention by judges, at-
torneys, and academians is badly needed. Disappointing as the opin-
ions of the military courts have been in providing a workable structure
for dealing with the First Amendment in the military context, they have
at least affirmed the applicability of the First Amendment to service-
men's speech and have at least established distinct limitations upon
certain types of military speech prosecutions. It is now vitally im-
portant that consideration be given to civilian law precedents in re-
lated areas, such as rights of students and government employees, and
to the competing interests involved in these military speech cases,
especially in terms of a realistic assessment of the nature and role
of the military in our contemporary society. The importance of the is-
sues at stake to the 3.5 million serving in the military and to our demo-
cratic society as a whole surely warrant that attention.
225. Howe v. Clifford, Civil No. 622-28 (D.D.C. 1968).
226. Levy v. Parker (M.D. Pa. 1969), petition for release on bail granted, 90
S. Ct. 1 (1969).
227. Daniels v. Laird, Civil No. HC 140-70 (D.D.C. 1970).
228. Stolte v. Laird, Civil No. 1764-70 (D.D.C. 1970).
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